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The dominant justification for copyright is based on the notion
that authors respond rationally to economic incentives. Despite the
dominance of this incentive model, many aspects of existing copyright
law are best understood as motivated by paternalism. Termination
rights permit authors to rescind their own earlier assignments of
copyright. The elimination of formalities protects careless authors
from forfeitures of copyright if they fail to register the copyright or
place appropriate notice on their works. The law limits how copyrights
can be transferred, when rights in emerging media can be assigned,
and which works can be designated as "made for hire" by contract.
Thus, while the basic model of copyright presumes that authors are
rational actors, many of its actual provisions suppose that authors are
not capable of understanding or protecting their own economic
interests. This Article highlights and seeks to understand the tension
between these two different conceptions of the author.
Building on recent critiques of copyright's incentive model and
on the insights of behavioral law and economics, this Article envisions
what a more unabashedly paternalistic copyright regime might look
like. Such a view accepts that authors are not rational actors; they are
shortsighted, lack bargaining power, and respond weakly to distant
and uncertain economic incentives. If we take this account seriously,
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copyright's existing paternalistic provisions are inadequate solutions to
the behavioral failures that they purport to remedy. Instead, a truly
paternalistic copyright regime would provide meaningful protections
for authors against one-sided copyright transfers and would rely on
more tailored and direct incentives for artistic creation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The dominant justification for copyright is based upon the
notion that authors respond rationally to economic incentives.' This
1. See, e.g., Shyam Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1569, 1571-73 (2009) ("Copyright law's principal justification today is the economic theory
of creator incentives . . . [wherein] [c]reators are presumed to be rational utility
maximizers .... ); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine
That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 30 (2011) ("[T]he standard American story about why we
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familiar incentive story posits that, without copyright, authors would
not create new works because others could freely pirate their
creations.2  Copyright solves this public goods problem by giving
authors a limited property right in their works, permitting them to
recoup the investment in time and effort necessary to create, thereby
providing the appropriate incentive to create new works.
3 Though
there have long been competing theories, this simple model has
always dominated the discourse in American copyright law.
4
But copyright does not seem to believe its own story. Despite
the dominance of the incentive model, many aspects of American
copyright law are best understood as being motivated by paternalism.
Most notably, termination rights give authors the option to undo
certain past transfers of their copyright-allowing, for example, a
singer-songwriter to void an ill-considered record company deal.
5 In a
similar vein, current law provides that only certain types of works can
be designed as "works made for hire" through contract.
6 The law
limits how copyright can be assigned and whether authors can
transfer rights in emerging media.7 By eliminating the formalities
once required to assert a copyright, the law protects a careless author
from forfeitures of copyright, even if she fails to register her copyright
or place appropriate notice on the work.8
have copyright is that it provides the economic incentive that is essential to the creation of new
works.").
2. See generally Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA.
L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2012) ("Without [the copyright] incentive, the theory goes, authors might not
invest the time, energy, and money necessary to create these works because they might be copied
cheaply and easily by free riders, eliminating authors' ability to profit from their works.").
3. See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39
FLA. ST. L. REV. 623, 629-32 (2012) (reviewing the traditional economic logic of copyright as a
solution to the "public good" nature of intellectual creations); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.L. STUD. 325, 326, 333-44 (1989)
(describing the nature of intellectual property as a public good and providing a formal economic
model of the effect of copyright protection on the creation of new works).
4. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 1-12 (2001) (reviewing non-incentive-based theories of
intellectual property); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 517-19 (2009) (describing copyright's dominant
incentive story as "elegant and simple," albeit problematic); infra notes 31-33 and accompanying
text.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (providing that an author or her heirs may terminate a grant
of copyright between thirty-five and forty years after the original transfer of rights, with all
rights reverting back to the author); see also Larry Rother, Record Industry Braces for Artists'
Battles over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2011, at CL.
6. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
738 (1989).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.
1988).
8. See infra notes 245-253 and accompanying text.
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Paternalism is the most natural way to understand these
aspects of copyright.9 "Paternalism," as used in this Article, does not
carry any inherently negative connotation. It simply means the state
limiting the choices of individuals in order to protect them from the
consequences of their own decisions.10  Copyright's paternalism
emerges from a different view of authors themselves. Provisions such
as termination rights are principally motivated by the perception that
authors systematically lack bargaining power in their dealings with
intermediaries such as publishers. Congress and the courts frequently
cite a romantic conception of the author as shortsighted, impecunious,
or irresponsible; the law should thus protect him, even from himself, if
need be." This conception of the author finds support in behavioral
economics, which has shown that humans exhibit bounded willpower
and rationality.12 Other accounts emphasize structural factors, such
as publishers' dominant market position or uncertainty in valuing
artistic works.13 Either way, these copyright provisions operate in a
paternalistic fashion in that they limit the freedom of authors for their
own supposed benefit.
Copyright's paternalistic provisions cast doubt on the incentive
model's conception of the author. The incentive model envisions
authors as hyper-rational economic actors who will only create new
works if, say, their copyright lasts seventy years after their death as
opposed to fifty years.14 Many actual copyright provisions, however,
suppose an unsophisticated, impulsive, or inept author who cannot
look out for his own interests, even in highly economic contexts such
as the negotiation of a contract. Taken on its own terms, copyright
law supposes two contractionary conceptions of the author: one in its
justifying model and another in its actual implementing provisions.
This Article seeks to highlight and understand the tension between
these two conflicting visions of author behavior in copyright.
This tension dovetails with recent empirical critiques of the
incentive model. A growing body of evidence suggests that a variety of
intrinsic motivations often drive creativity, not the external economic
9. See infra Part IV (arguing that these provisions can be understood as motivated by
paternalism).
10. See infra note 112 (discussing definition of paternalism).
11. See infra notes 176-178, 190-193, 215-217, 231-232, 241-243, 261 and
accompanying text.
12. See infra Section III.A (reviewing behavioral deviations from the rational actor
model).
13. See infra notes 197-199, 229 and accompanying text.
14. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206 (2003) (discussing how extending
copyright term from life of the author plus fifty years to life plus seventy years "may also provide




incentive of copyright. Social science and psychological research
suggests that creativity is usually driven by urges for self-
development, personal satisfaction, and a desire to challenge oneself.
15
Personal accounts of creators ranging from famous authors to
uncompensated writers of fan fiction assert that passion, desire, or
reputation motivate them to create new works.
16  Insights from
cultural theory emphasize the role of creative play and the
surrounding cultural environment.1  Digital projects such as
Wikipedia and open source software provide concrete examples of
important and valuable creation that occurs with no expectation of
remuneration via copyright or otherwise." Of course, economic
incentives are clearly important to some types of creativity, and the
significance of intrinsic motivation can be overstated.19 Nonetheless,
there is abundant evidence that authors do not respond to economic
incentives in the simple way that the incentive model predicts.
Using the lens of behavioral law and economics, this Article
explores the normative and policy implications of copyright
paternalism's conception of author rationality, which supposes that
authors are not rational economic actors. Instead, this view sees
authors as shortsighted actors that lack bargaining power and
respond weakly to distant and uncertain economic incentives. If this
view is an accurate depiction, the current law's relatively weak
protections are ineffective at achieving their stated goals. Most of
copyright's paternalistic provisions are relatively modest, principally
formal procedural requirements or contractual defaults. Behavioral
law and economics analysis reveals that such "soft" paternalistic
15. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of
the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1947, 1970 (2006) ("[C]reativity is spurred
largely by incentives that are noneconomic in nature," including inherent motivations such as
"challenge, personal satisfaction, or the creation of works with particular meaning or significance
for the author."); Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 42-48 (reviewing psychological and behavioral
economics studies showing that "human creativity is primarily driven by intrinsic factors" rather
than the "promise of monetary or other extrinsic rewards").
16. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 522-36 (describing these narratives).
17. See Julie Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1151, 1178-79 (2007) (drawing on social and cultural theory to offer a "decentered" account of
creativity wherein "situated users appropriate cultural goods for purposes of creative play").
18. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3, at 647-52 (discussing the flourishing of intrinsically
motivated creative production on the Internet).
19. See Johnathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 389, 394
(2013) (arguing that the evidence for intrinsic motivation is "far from fully persuasive" and that
"artists are motivated by a mix of profit and non-profit-based objectives"); Christopher
Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws' Creativity Thresholds, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1932-43 (2014) (reviewing psychological literature and concluding that
although "[some] studies find that intrinsic motivation is more conducive to creativity than
extrinsic motivation . . . there are other studies that suggest that extrinsic rewards do not always
undermine creativity").
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interventions tend to fail as a result of the very same behavioral
failures that motivated the regulation in the first place. If copyright
law truly wishes to protect authors, it should consider mandatory
contractual interventions, such as guarantees of equitable
compensation, and an incentive structure more closely tailored to
imperfectly rational authors.
This Article is intended as an exploration, not a normative
endorsement of any particular reform. The optimal policy to
encourage creation and dissemination of new works, of course,
depends on many normative assumptions and complicated empirical
realities that are beyond the scope of this Article-most critically, the
optimal level of creation and the costs of various means of encouraging
creation. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to consider what a truly
paternalistic regime might look like, both as a thought experiment
and as an examination of oft-overlooked policy tools. Full
consideration of these policy levers is critical in light of the recent
push by the Register of Copyrights for a complete revision of American
copyright law.2 0
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows: Part II
provides background on the economic incentives model for copyright
as well as its competing theories, and surveys the recent debates over
the empirical basis of those models. Part III reviews a similar shift in
thinking spurred by the field of behavioral law and economics and
identifies several behavioral market failures that impact artistic
creation and dissemination. Part IV examines the motivations for
copyright law's paternalistic provisions and argues that they are most
naturally understood as a paternalistic response to authors'
behavioral failings. This analysis reveals an important tension
between the incentive model that underpins copyright's foundation,
and many specific provisions of copyright law itself. Part V uses the
tools of behavioral economics to critique copyright law's existing
paternalistic provisions and envisions the legal structure that a truly
paternalistic copyright law could take.
II. COPYRIGHT THEORY
American copyright law is principally justified by a theory of
creator incentives. This Part first reviews the traditional incentive
model that remains the dominant justification for copyright law.
Next, it surveys the growing body of empirical evidence that raises
serious questions about that model. Studies in fields as diverse as
20. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 322
(2013) (urging comprehensive copyright law revision).
420 [Vol. XIX:3:415
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economics, psychology, and cultural theory, as well as first-hand
accounts of creators themselves, suggest that intrinsic motivations
drive much artistic creation. This Part concludes by briefly
overviewing alternative theories to justify copyright. While the
critiques of the incentive model do not directly impact these competing
theories, they have had secondary and limited influence in American
copyright law.
The overview presented here is necessarily brief and cannot
give full due to either the dominant incentive theory of copyright or its
many competitors, some of which have received book-length
treatment.21 Moreover, this Article does not intend to endorse any
particular theory of copyright; it focuses on the incentive model simply
because it is the dominant one in American legal discourse. Finally,
this Article does not purport to reach an ultimate conclusion as to
whether the incentive model is supported by the available evidence.
Although there is substantial commentary questioning the incentive
model, significant arguments and evidence exist supporting the
model.22  Putting aside this question, the crux of this Article's
argument is the incentive model's internal tension with many actual
provisions of copyright law. That incongruity is explored in depth in
later sections.
A. The Incentive Model
American copyright is primarily justified by a simple,
utilitarian, economic argument, which asserts that copyright is
necessary to encourage the creation of new works. The traditional
logic goes as follows: in a world without copyright, once an artistic
work is written and published, free riders could cheaply make and sell
copies of that work (merely the cost to make a copy), denying authors
the ability to profit from their work.23 In particular, authors would
not be able to recoup their investments of time and effort necessary to
create the work; as a result, authors would not bother to create new
21. See generally ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY (2009)
(developing a vision of copyright as grounded in moral rights and the intrinsic dimension of
creativity); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003) (providing detailed economic theory and model of
intellectual property); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011)
(providing a normative theory of intellectual property relying on the foundational philosophy of
Locke, Kant, and Rawls); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008) (offering a
vision of copyright animated by First Amendment and democratic values). For a more
comprehensive overview and taxonomy of intellectual property theories, see Fisher, supra note 4.
22. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
23. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 40-41.
4212017]
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works.2 4 As Samuel Johnson famously put it, "no man but a blockhead
ever wrote but for money."25 Copyright provides a monetary reward
by legally prohibiting the copying and sale of works without
permission from the copyright holder.26 This exclusivity permits
authors to sell their work at a higher price and to thereby recover the
costs of creation, providing the necessary. incentive to create in the
first instance.
In the language of neoclassical economics, copyright solves a
"public goods" problem. Public goods are defined as (i) non-rivalrous
(one person's enjoyment of the good does not negatively impact
another's enjoyment) and (ii) non-excludable (absent legal rights, it is
difficult to limit access to the good).27 Intellectual creations have a
strong public good character because they can be replicated cheaply
and easily.2 8 Absent legal intervention, economic theory predicts that
public goods will tend to be under-produced because of the problem of
free riders, who can undercut the original author by selling copies at
marginal cost.2 9  Importantly, however, the traditional law and
economics account also recognizes the costs of the copyright protection,
which include decreased consumption of works by the public because
of higher cost, as well as fewer works created because of limited access
to creative raw materials.30 Accordingly, the protection afforded by
copyright should be limited in time and scope to ideally provide just
enough incentive to create without unduly limiting access.
This incentive model is far and away the dominant theory of
American copyright law. It is said to be found in the US
Constitution's intellectual property clause, which provides that
Congress has power to grant copyrights and patents "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."3 1 The Supreme Court has
expressly endorsed it on several occasions.32 So has Congress.33
24. Fromer, supra note 2, at 1750-51.
25. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (quoting JAMES
BOSwELL, 3 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934)).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
27. Johnson, supra note 3, at 628-29.
28. See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 326.
29. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 40 ("In the absence of copyright protection the
market price of a book or other expressive work will eventually be bid down to the marginal cost
of copying, with the result that the work may not be produced in the first place . . . .").
30. See id. at 22-24 (costs in reduced access to works); id. at 66-70 (costs to subsequent
intellectual creators).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("[Copyright] is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward .... ); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
422 [Vol. XIX:3:415
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Despite its dominance, scholars have raised important
objections to the incentive model on its own terms. The most obvious
is that copyright does not actually guarantee authors any economic
benefit. Rights are not the same as compensation, and the reward
promised by copyright is dependent upon success in the market, which
is usually both unlikely and unpredictable.34  Furthermore, the
current scope of copyright gives creators such expansive rights that it
can seem implausible that those rights actually motivated the original
creation.35  Copyright extends to new technologies and derivative
works created decades later, even if these new uses were not
foreseeable at the time of creation.36  Finally, it is questionable
whether the incentive story, as invoked by Congress and others to
support expansions of copyright, is sincere. From a more cynical view,
the incentive model is merely rhetoric used to invoke the sympathetic
figure of the author in order to mask the primary beneficiaries of
expansions of copyright: industry stakeholders such as movie studios,
publishers, and record companies.37
general public good."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy
behind [intellectual property] is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors . . . .").
33. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) ("The enactment of copyright
legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right
that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited
periods the exclusive rights to their writings."); Fromer, supra note 2, at 1750.
34. See Barnett, supra note 19, at 398 (reviewing the "high costs and risks of creative
production" and characterizing creative goods as a "hits market"); Tushnet, supra note 4, at 517
("[R]ights don't mean payment.").
35. See Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
5-11, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846 (arguing that
copyright term is so long that an extension provides "essentially no incentive to create new
works"); Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1571-76 (articulating this problem and arguing that the
scope of copyright should be limited to uses that the copyright owner "could have reasonably
foreseen at the time that the work was created").
36. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(1) (2012) (providing exclusive right "to reproduce the work in
copies" by "any method now known or later developed"); see Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1572-75.
37. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-63 (2d ed. 2006) (describing
copyright law-making process as driven by concentrated groups of industry stakeholders); Cohen,
supra note 17, at 1192 ("Lobbyists for the copyright industries are in the habit of asserting that
copyright is the single most critical prerequisite for a vibrant artistic and intellectual culture.
Some of this is theater driven by political expediency."); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality
in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1996) (arguing that copyright's author-centered
rhetoric has been employed to benefit copyright industry groups and cannot fully account for
copyright's expansion).
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B. Critiques of the Incentive Model
Whatever the flaws of the incentive model, it does generate
testable predictions. It is, after all, a theory of how people behave.
This Section surveys a growing body of scholarship that challenges the
empirical foundations of copyright's incentive model. A repeated
theme in this literature is the notion that intrinsic motivation, not the
extrinsic economic incentive of copyright, underlies much artistic
creation. Intrinsic motivation refers to an individual's desire to do
something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable; extrinsic
motivation relies on incentives external to the individual, such as a
payment of money.38 To be sure, the evidence in favor of intrinsic
motivation is not conclusive, and a careful analysis of the social
science reveals that the degree of responsiveness to external
incentives may depend on the individuals involved, the type of work at
issue, the threshold for creativity, and other factors.39 Nonetheless, it
seems clear that many creators do not respond to economic incentives
in the straightforward way envisioned by the incentive model.
Perhaps the most forceful arguments against the incentive
model are those recently put forth by Diane Zimmerman and Eric
Johnson. Zimmerman relies on a number of studies in psychology and
behavioral economics to conclude that copyright's incentive story is
"based on partially or even wholly mistaken beliefs about human
behavior."40 Her first insight points to the extremely uncertain nature
of economic returns from creative activity. Because average writers
can only expect to earn less than the minimum wage for their work, "it
is more credible to understand their devotion to the production of
expressive works more as a product of love than as a response to the
promise of money."41 This intuition is bolstered by a raft of studies
from psychology and social science tending to show that human
creativity is driven mainly by intrinsic motivations such as
self-actualization or the simple love of the creative endeavor.42 Even
more provocatively, research from the social sciences suggests that
38. Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic
Definitions and New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 54, 55-60 (2000).
39. See Buccafusco et al., supra note 19, at 1932-43 (reviewing social science literature
and concluding that while some studies find that creativity is more conducive to intrinsic
motivation, other studies show that extrinsic motivation can enhance creativity under some
circumstances).
40. Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 34.
41. Id. at 38-40. Zimmerman acknowledges that there are ways to account for such
behavior on a neoclassical economic model, such as "a lottery theory," but finds it difficult to
"squeeze the starving artist into that familiar storyline." Id. at 41-42.




offering economic incentives can actually be detrimental to creativity
in some circumstances.4 3 For this reason, Zimmerman urges that, in
policymaking, "skepticism about the market incentive story can be a
useful antidote to copyright's excess[es] ."44
Johnson goes even further than Zimmerman to flatly reject
what he calls the "incentive fallacy" in copyright.45 Like Zimmerman,
Johnson relies extensively on studies of intrinsic motivation in
psychology and behavioral economics to conclude that, by and large,
people are "intrinsically motivated to undertake novel and challenging
intellectual tasks" like artistic creation.46 Johnson broadens his case,
however, by looking to the flourishing world of user-generated digital
content, which is typically created by "legions of everyday
nonprofessionals" with "zero expectation of getting paid."47 Wikipedia,
YouTube, blogs, and the open source software movement are cited as
familiar examples.48 Johnson also questions the historical basis of the
incentive model's promise of rewards for creators, in that early forms
of intellectual property granted monopolies to publishers, not to
writers.49  Johnson is perhaps most bold in his policy
recommendations, urging that existing copyrights be eliminated in
favor of narrow, industry-specific rights for the limited areas (such as
Hollywood movies) where they are truly needed to incentivize artistic
creation.50
Rebecca Tushnet takes a different perspective in her critique of
the incentive model, focusing on firsthand accounts and lived
experiences of authors.5 1 Tushnet concludes that "[m]any standard
experiences of creativity simply do not fit into the incentive model."
52
43. See id. at 50-54.
44. Id. at 54-55.
45. Johnson, supra note 3, at 623.
46. See id. at 640-46 (citing studies by Teresa Amabile and Edward Deci, among
others).
47. Id. at 647-48.
48. See id. at 650-52 (reviewing examples of digital creativity).
49. See id. at 635-40 (questioning consistency of early history of intellectual property
and the incentive model).
50. Id. at 675-76 (arguing that the flaws in the incentive model mean that copyright
should be "phased out entirely" and replaced with "very targeted, industry-sector-specific,
application-specific rights").
51. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 515-16. In some ways, Tushnet's work builds upon the
tradition of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, whose psychological research relied extensively on
firsthand interviews with creators. See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INNOVATION 2 (2d ed. 2013). Csikszentmihalyi reaches similar
conclusions about intrinsic motivation. See id. at 107 ("It is not the hope of achieving fame or
making money that drives [creative persons]; rather, it is the opportunity to do the work that
they enjoy doing.").
52. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 522.
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Those experiences are of course varied, but, by their own accounts,
authors are driven more by passion than economic reward: they write
because they enjoy doing so, to make a mark, or because they feel a
compulsion to do so. 53 Critically, Tushnet finds a surprising degree of
similarity between the accounts of prominent writers working in
traditional markets and creators of "fanworks" who typically publish
their work online for free.54 Tushnet is careful not to conclude from
her analysis that economic incentives are necessarily "irrelevant or
disrespectable," but nonetheless urges recognition that the reality of
creation is richer and messier than the incentive model supposes.55
Julie Cohen's scholarship questions the incentive model from
yet another viewpoint-that of postmodern social and cultural
theory.56 Drawing on this body of thinking, as well as insights from
psychology and the narratives of creators, Cohen denies the
descriptive truth of the "incentives-for-authors" story.57  Instead, she
relies on cultural theory to develop a complex account of creativity
that emphasizes the dynamic interactions between creators and the
surrounding cultural context, wherein situated users engage in
creative play within a particular socio-cultural environment.58
Copyright plays, at best, a "modest" role in stimulating such creative
practice.59  To similar effect, albeit distinct in methodological
approach, is the work of Roberta Kwall. Kwall relies on theological
and secular narratives of creation to emphasize the inspirational or
religious aspect common to many accounts of creativity.60
A team of researchers led by Raymond Ku takes a more data-
oriented approach to testing the incentive model, examining whether
changes in copyright protections correlate with an increase in the
number of new works created.61 In other words, do expansions of
53. See id. at 522-36 (reviewing accounts of writers who cite these motivations).
54. See id. at 546 ("[C]reators' passions are strikingly similar across the boundary
between 'original'/authorized and unauthorized derivative works.").
55. Id. at 516.
56. See generally Cohen, supra note 17; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the
Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 Wis. L. REV. 141, 142-49 [hereinafter Cohen
II].
57. Cohen II, supra note 56, at 143 ("Everything we know about creativity and creative
processes uggests that copyright plays very little role in motivating creative work.").
58. See Cohen, supra note 17, at 1177-92 (providing a "decentered" account of creativity
based on the insights of "social and cultural theory").
59. Id. at 1193 ("[Cultural theory] suggest[s] a much more modest conception of the role
that copyright plays in stimulating creative processes and practices.").
60. See generally Kwall, supra note 15, at 1951-70 (drawing on historical and
theological accounts of creativity to conclude that "creativity is spurred by incentives that are
noneconomic in nature").
61. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An
Empirical Analysis of Copyright's Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1671 (2009).
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copyright (e.g., increased duration, subject matter, or scope of
protection) actually correspond to increased artistic creation,
measured by the number of works registered with the Copyright
Office?62 Ku and his team found that, although changes in copyright
law sometimes lead to increases in the number of works registered,
the correlation was weak and unpredictable.6
3 At best, it was "slightly
better than a coin toss whether a legal change will have any effect,"
and increases in the number of new works were largely a function of
population growth.64 The researchers concluded that "the data do not
support" the incentive model.65
To similar effect is the work of Christopher Sprigman, William
Landes, and Richard Posner concerning the rate at which eligible
copyrighted works were registered and renewed under the former
system of copyright formalities.6
6 Even though creators would forfeit
their copyright if they failed to take these steps, most did not bother to
register a copyright when their work was published, and even fewer
took the opportunity to renew the copyright.
67 This suggests that the,
incentive of copyright was unimportant to these authors or that the
expected value of the work was so low that it was not worthwhile to
assert copyright.
Despite this diverse body of scholarship questioning the
incentive model, there is by no means a consensus on the issue. First,
there is room to debate how broadly to understand the experimental
results from psychology and behavioral economics, which usually rely
on artificial experimental environments. For example, a team of legal
scholars lead by Christopher Buccafusco analyzes much of the same
social science literature as Zimmerman and Johnson, but is more
circumspect about how far to read the results. The scholars
acknowledge some evidence that intrinsic motivations are more
conducive to creativity, but point to "other studies that suggest that
62. See id. at 1689-95 (outlining the methodology of the study).
63. Id. at 1673 ("[T]here is no uniform or fully predictable statistical relationship
between laws that increase copyright term, subject matter, rights, or criminal penalties and the
number of new works registered in general. Overall, the most one can expect is a 38 percent
chance that a law increasing copyright protection will lead to an increase in the number of new
registrations . . . .").
64. Id. at 1672, 1708.
65. See id. at 1672 ("Despite the logic of the theory that increasing copyright protection
will increase the number of copyrighted works, the data do not support it.").
66. See infra Section IV.C (discussing copyright formalities).
67. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 234-37 (finding renewal rates from
1910-1991 ranged between approximately 5 and 20 percent of registered works); Johnson, supra
note 3, at 658-59 (reviewing studies estimating that between 5 and 50 percent of published
works were registered); see also Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 485, 503-13 (2004).
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extrinsic rewards do not always undermine creativity and can, in fact,
enhance it."68 In their view, the results are best reconciled as
revealing that the efficacy of extrinsic incentives depends on the task
at issue, how the subjects are instructed, how performance is
measured, and the level of reward.69 For example, Buccafusco's own
work finds that the threshold by which creativity is measured can
affect responsiveness to external incentives.70  Nonetheless, the
scholars agree that individuals respond to incentives in a much more
complex way than the incentive model suggests.71
In a similar vein, the first-hand accounts of creators
themselves can be questioned as unrepresentative of their "true"
motivations, or simply beside the point. Jonathan Barnett, for
example, notes that the "romantic" behavior of artists can be
explained by the authors' "chronic overestimate of, rather than
indifference to, commercial success."7 2 Additionally, it is also almost
certainly true that the degree of intrinsic motivation depends upon the
type of artistic work at issue.73 Context matters: academics and
creators of fanworks, for example, are driven by a different mix of
incentives than, say, popular music artists.74 Indeed, even the most
strident critics of the incentive model acknowledge that copyright
matters for large-scale, capital-intensive productions like Hollywood
movies where the intrinsic motivation story is not a persuasive
account.76 Certainly, no one denies that artists must find a way to
support themselves in order to engage in their craft full time.
In sum, although many scholars have raised serious questions
about the incentive model, there are reasons to be skeptical that
extrinsic motivations do not play any role at all in motivating
creativity. Intrinsic motivation may be the primary driving force
behind much artistic creation, but extrinsic incentives may have some
68. Buccafusco et al., supra note 19, at 1937-38.
69. See id. at 1939-43 (engaging in "meta-analysis" of the social science research on
creativity and incentives).
70. Id. at 1972-73.
71. Id. at 1939 ("Ultimately, however, one cannot simply assume that the addition of an
incentive to an already motivated person will always yield more or better creative production.").
72. Barnett, supra note 19, at 394.
73. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality
by Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (observing
that copyrightable works like "email and other personal communications, model legal codes,
standard portrait photography, amateur/home photography, architectural works, advertising
artwork and advertising copy, scholarly articles, and legal documents" are created without
regard to the incentive of copyright).
74. Cf. id. at 34-40 (proposing to limit scope of copyright protection for works that are
primarily driven by non-copyright motivations).
75. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3, at 672-73 (acknowledging that a strong case for
copyright incentives can be made in the case of "large-budget major motion pictures").
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role depending upon context, the type of work at issue, the nature of
the incentive, and other factors. In other words, the reality of
motivation is complicated and contextual, like creators themselves. It
seems fair to conclude, however, that the simple "the more economic
motivation the better" story of the incentive model is not supported by
the available evidence. Whether and how authors respond to extrinsic
incentives to create depends on the circumstances, and intrinsic
motivation plays a much greater role in creativity than is usually
appreciated.
C. Alternatives to Traditional Incentive Theory
Although the incentive model is the dominant justification for
copyright in American law, it is not the only theoretical basis for
copyright.7 6 This Section briefly reviews some competing models of
copyright, which are not directly impacted by the empirical evidence
that intrinsic motivation often drives artistic creation. These theories
may give pause to those who would jump from critiques of the
incentive model to the policy conclusion that there is no need for
copyright.7 It should be noted, however, that these theories have had
limited influence on American copyright law.
Most alternative theories of copyright are grounded in
deontological or rights-based notions, in contrast to the utilitarian
focus of the incentive model. For example, notions of copyright as a
just desert for an author's labor are prominent in the European
copyright tradition. French droit d'auteur, which has been influential
in civil law systems, is said to derive from John Locke's theory of labor
as the foundation of property.7 8 The essential idea is that authors
deserve property rights in their work by virtue of the labor and effort
that they apply to common resources in the process of intellectual
76. See generally Fisher, supra note 4 (surveying theories of intellectual property);
Fromer, supra note 2, at 1749-56 (same).
77. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3, at 675-76 (urging sunsetting of intellectual
property rights); Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 54 (suggesting that elimination of copyright,
although impractical, might be ideal).
78. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-49 (1993)
(applying Lockean labor theory to intellectual property); Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-
Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 554-55 (2006) ("[I]n civil law countries such as France, the more
individual-centered droit d'auteur system gives special importance to the principles of natural
justice. . . .").
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creation.79 Although this concept has its defenders, the Supreme
Court has rejected labor as a basis for copyright.80
Other rights theorists look to personhood theory, which derives
from the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, as the foundation for
copyright.81  These theorists view property rights as essential to
human freedom and self-development.82  Personhood theorists argue
that because an artistic work is an expression of the author's
personality and autonomy, the law should afford it legal protections.83
Appeals to personhood theory are frequently invoked to justify the
expansion of "moral rights," such as attribution requirements, which
are historically quite limited in American copyright law.8
Several scholars of copyright have invoked democratic theory
or social planning as a basis for copyright.85  Neil Netanel, for
example, advances a view of copyright designed to promote democratic
and First Amendment values.86  Other theorists invoke broader
visions of the good life and a just society as underlying copyright.
William Fisher, for example, relies on notions of a "just and attractive
intellectual culture" designed to promote human flourishing in
79. See generally Gordon, supra note 78, at 1544-45; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 287 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-314 (providing a Lockean justification for
intellectual property).
80. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1991) (rejecting the
"sweat of the brow" as a valid basis for copyright protection). Despite the dominance of the
incentive model, the language of labor-desert theory nonetheless frequently creeps into Supreme
Court opinions. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546
(1985) ("The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of
knowledge a fair return for their labors.").
81. See generally Fisher, supra note 4, at 5-6 (overviewing personhood theory of
intellectual property); Fromer, supra note 2, at 1753-54 (same); Hughes, supra note 79, at
330-64 (providing Hegelian justification for intellectual property).
82. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958
(1982) ("The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-
development-to be a person-an individual needs some control over resources in the external
environment.").
83. Hughes, supra note 79, at 330.
84. See, e.g., id. at 339-50 (deriving moral right protections against mutilation and
misattribution from Hegelian personhood theory); accord Kwall, supra note 15, at 1975-77. For a
forceful argument against moral rights protection, see Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL.
L. REV. 263 (2009).
85. See generally Oren Bracha & Tallha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive
Theories of Copyright, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 219, 248-58 (2014) (surveying theories of
intellectual property based on democratic, distributional, and utopian values); Fisher, supra note
4, at 6-7 (same).
86. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 341-64 (1996) (outlining a conceptual framework for copyright that enhances free
speech and democratic values).
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determining the proper scope of copyright.8 7 Still others rely upon
notions of distributive justice to inform their views of intellectual
property.88
However, not all alternative theories of copyright are
rights-based. Jonathan Barnett's recent scholarship, for example,
rejects the incentive model but still relies primarily on economic
analysis. In Barnett's view, the evidence that creators are motivated
by intrinsic desires, even if correct, is simply beside the point.
89
Copyright is not intended to provide an incentive for authors to create,
but as an incentive for intermediaries to distribute, market, and
disseminate artistic works.90 There is an interesting convergence
between Barnett's views and those of more radical critics of the
incentive model, who agree that copyright is primarily valuable to
intermediaries like movie studios and record companies.
9i Whatever
explanatory power the incentives-for-intermediaries story may have,
Barnett's account is in some tension with the constitutional basis for
copyright, which grants rights "to Authors."
92
Finally, some scholars reject the divisions between these
various theories to advance a vision of copyright that relies upon both
rights-based and utilitarian notions. In a recent book, Rob Merges
presents a rich and nuanced account of intellectual property theory.
In Merges' theory, although the normative foundations of intellectual
property lie in the philosophy of Locke, Kant, and Rawls, those deep
theoretical foundations yield to practical, mid-level principles-such
as economic efficiency-that must guide the law on the operational
level.93 Along similar lines, Jeanne Fromer argues that there is less of
a practical divide between utilitarian and rights-based theories than is
87. William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1659, 1774-83 (1988) (arguing that fair use should operate to promote a "just and attractive
intellectual culture").
88. See generally Bracha & Syed, supra note 85, at 287-96 (surveying distributive
justice concerns in intellectual property theory); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the
Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2832 (2006); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling,
Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (2005); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost
of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970,
993 (2012).
89. See Barnett, supra note 19, at 404 ("Assuming for the sake of argument that artists
require no significant monetary inducement to invest in creative production, it still is the case
that copyright supports investment by intermediaries . . . .").
90. Id. at 390 ("Copyright ... is best conceived as a system for incentivizing investment
by the intermediaries responsible for undertaking the capital-intensive tasks required to deliver
a creative work from an individual artist to a mass audience.").
91. See, e.g., Cohen II, supra note 56, at 142-43 (arguing for recognition that copyright
is not about protecting authors but instead the "corporate welfare" of intermediaries).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
93. MERGES, supra note 21, at 5-15.
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often appreciated because moral rights concerns frequently align with
social utility. 94
III. PATERNALISM IN BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
Many critiques of copyright's incentive model have relied on or
been inspired by the insights of behavioral law and economics ("BLE").
Both BLE scholars and critics of copyright's incentive model share a
skepticism of the concept of a rational economic actor. This Part
reviews how legal scholars have used the insights of behavioral
economics to inform traditional economic analysis of the law and
applies the BLE framework to copyright. It first briefly reviews the
evidence of systematic deviations from the rational actor model,
including limitations on human rationality, willpower, and self-
interest. It next turns to the debate within BLE over the appropriate
policy response to these limitations. Although early forms of BLE
emphasized "soft" paternalistic tools such as increased information
disclosure or changes to default choices, there has been a recent push
toward acceptance of hard paternalism such as government mandates.
This Part concludes by applying this framework to copyright,
introducing several behavioral market failures that might justify such
regulatory intervention.
A. Deviations from the Rational Actor Model
Traditional economic models presume an individual with stable
and coherent preferences who rationally makes choices to maximize
those preferences.95  Copyright's incentive model, for example,
envisions this type of rational author.96 Results from several decades
of psychological research have given rise to a more nuanced view of
human behavior-that of behavioral economics-which profoundly
challenges the notion that humans behave like rational economic
94. Fromer, supra note 2, at 1746.
95. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)
("[H]uman behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a
stable set of preferences . . . ."); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 2007)
("The task of economics, so defined, is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a
rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what we shall call his 'self-interest."');
Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 11 (1998) ("Economics
has conventionally assumed that each individual has stable and coherent preferences, and that
she rationally maximizes those preferences. Given a set of options and probabilistic beliefs, a
person is assumed to maximize the expected value of a utility function, U(x).").
96. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 333-44 (presenting a formal economic
model of copyright); see supra Section II.A (reviewing the incentive model of copyright).
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actors as a general matter.9 7 This view of human behavior asserts
that human rationality, self-interest, and willpower are limited in
important and systematic ways.98
It should surprise no one that humans are fallible beings.
These deviations for the rational actor model-known as "behavioral
failures" or "behavioral effects"-can be grouped into three major
categories.
First, evidence suggests that humans are boundedly rational,
with limited cognitive abilities. As a result, we often make decisions
using mental shortcuts called "heuristics," leading to mistakes and
biases in judgment.99 We have a bias for the status quo, overvalue
goods initially allocated to us, and excessively dislike losses.
100 We are
particularly bad at judgments under uncertainty, i.e., making
decisions involving probabilistic outcomes. For such decisions, we rely
on heuristics that deeply misunderstand the laws of probability.
101
Second, humans have bounded willpower, often acting in
impulsive ways that are inconsistent with our expressed long-run
preferences.102 The familiar examples of overeating, procrastination,
and addictive behavior suffice to illustrate this phenomenon.
103
97. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (surveying
evidence detailing behavioral departures from the neoclassical model of the rational economic
actor); Rabin, supra note 95 (same).
98. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1476-79 (1998) (reviewing evidence of bounded rationality, willpower, and self-
interest); Sendhil Mallainathan & Richard Thaler, Behavioral Economics 5-7 (Mass. Inst. of
Tech. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 00-27, 2000),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2 4 5 8 28  [https://perma.cc/32UL-8LTL]
(same). This Article will provide only a brief overview of the principal results from behavioral
economics and applied psychological research. For a good introduction aimed at a generalist
audience, see generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 97. For a brief and effective review of the
underlying economic studies, see generally Rabin, supra note 95.
99. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1976) ("[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to
simpler judgmental operations.").
100. See Rabin, supra note 95, at 13-14 (reviewing loss aversion, the status quo bias, and
the endowment effect).
101. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1084-102 (2000)
(presenting evidence of availability, representativeness, and anchoring heuristics); Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 99, at 1124-29.
102. Jolls et al., supra note 98, at 1545 ("People also have bounded willpower; they can be
tempted and are sometimes myopic."); Rabin, supra note 95, at 12, 38-40 ("[Pleople have a short-
run propensity to pursue immediate gratification that is inconsistent with their long-run
preferences.").
103. See Alessandro Bucciol, Daniel Houser & Marco Piovesan, Willpower in Children
and Adults: A Survey of Result and Economic Implications, 57 INT'L REV. ECON. 259, 260-63
(2010) (reviewing studies of bounded willpower and citing overeating, smoking and
procrastination as examples).
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Finally, humans have bounded self-interest: our preferences are
not guided only by our own welfare, as some traditional economic
models suppose. Rather, humans are willing to sacrifice their own
self-interest to act altruistically when they believe that others are
cooperating and spitefully if others are not.104 Furthermore, we have
a preference for "fair" allocations of resources, choosing to equalize
welfare gains rather than maximize total social welfare.105
A few behavioral findings are most relevant for present
purposes. First, as already discussed, humans are intrinsically
motivated to perform certain tasks.106 They engage in some work not
for money but for the joy of doing it or due to a drive to excel; economic
rewards can actually diminish these intrinsic motivations.107 Second,
because of bounded willpower, humans can act in ways that are
shortsighted, pursuing immediate gratification to their own long-term
detriment.108 Third, because of our bias for the status quo, the default
option and whether a system is structured on an opt-out or opt-in
basis have a big impact on the choices people make.109 How choices
are framed can also make a big difference: people's decisions are
sensitive to context and they can fail to even notice incentives that are
indirect or lack salience.110 Finally, because of social preferences,
people disfavor some socially efficient outcomes if they seem to give
one party the short end of the deal.11
These human limitations can create behavioral market failures
and therefore, arguably, a need for government regulation to solve
them. This raises the policy question of the best way to regulate in
light of this richer conception of human behavior, which is the
principal challenge of the BLE movement.
104. See Jolls et al., supra note 98, at 1489-97 (reviewing behavioral evidence of
altruism, reciprocity, and acrimony); Rabin, supra note 95, at 21-24 (same).
105. Rabin, supra note 95, at 17-20.
106. See supra Section II.B.
107. See supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of intrinsic
motivation).
108. See Jolls et al., supra note 98, at 1545 ("People also have bounded willpower; they
can be tempted and are sometimes myopic."); Rabin, supra note 95, at 12, 38-40 ("[P]eople have
a short-run propensity to pursue immediate gratification that is inconsistent with their long-run
preferences.").
109. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and
the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism", 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1224-30 (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1159, 1171-82 (2003).
110. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 98-99 (2008); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 346, 350 (1984); Rabin, supra note 95, at 36-38.
111. See Jolls et al., supra note 98, at 1489-97; Rabin, supra note 95, at 17-20, 21-24.
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B. Soft and Hard Behavioral Law and Economics
Behavioral market failures raise obvious questions about the
propriety of paternalism as a regulatory tool.1 1 2 If individuals act in
ways that are irrational or against self-interest, should the state
protect them from their own "bad" decisions? Many prominent
proponents of BLE assiduously resist this impulse, advocating only
"soft" paternalistic tools, such as information disclosure or
manipulation of default rules.113 Recently, however, several scholars
have questioned whether this limitation is principled and embraced
the possibility that the "hard paternalism" of direct mandates may in
some cases be the optimal policy, even if they may be disparaged as
paternalistic. 114
Two influential law review articles, both published in 2003,
epitomize the soft paternalism approach.
115  The work of Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler proposes "libertarian paternalism" as a
112. I use "paternalism" to mean governmental or other actors limiting the choices of
individuals in order to protect them from the consequences of their own decisions. See Gerald
Dworkin, Paternalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE,
http://plato.stanford.edularchives/sum2014/entries/paternalism/ [https://perma.cc/2SX4-AHNN]
(last updated June 4, 2014); accord Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon's Teeth and
Claws: The Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 683-84 (2004) (defining
paternalism as when an agent limits a subject's liberty for the subject's own benefit, independent
of the subject's own preferences); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229,
236 (1998) ("Paternalism is intervention in a person's freedom aimed at furthering her own
good."); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (Edward Alexander ed., 1999) ("[T]he only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant."). I have attempted to use a minimal definition, as there is much debate over
how best to define paternalism. See Wendy Mariner, Paternalism, Public Health, and Behavioral
Economics: A Problematic Combination, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1817, 1820 n.2 (2014) (collecting
sources); Zamir, supra, at 236 n.3 (same). I do not mean the word to carry any inherently
negative connotation. Cf. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 109, at 1166 ("The thrust of our
argument is that the term 'paternalistic' should not be considered pejorative, just descriptive.").
113. See Camerer et al., supra note 109, at 1212, 1224-47 (focusing on regulations such
as default rules, information disclosure, and "cooling off' periods that "impose[] little or no harm
on those who are fully rational"); Jolls et al., supra note 98, at 1541 ("[B]ounded rationality
pushes toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism-a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an
affirmative defense of paternalism."); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 109, at 1661-62 (urging
'libertarian paternalism," in which default rules, starting points, and decision framing are
changed to help people make better decisions while preserving individual choice). Other early
BLE advocates, even if they did not foreclose paternalist mandates as an option, approached this
possibility warily and tentatively.
114. Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economic Trims Its Sails and
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1605-06 (2014).
115. See id. at 1604-05 (describing the approach of Sunstein and Thaler, and Camerer,
as "soft paternalism"); Camerer et al., supra note 109; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 109. The
usage of soft and hard paternalism in behavioral law and economics should not be confused with
the slightly different philosophical usage, which hinges on whether the choice being restricted is
truly "voluntary." See generally Pope, supra note 112, at 667-69.
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response to behavioral market failures. Libertarian paternalism
urges manipulation of choice architecture-via default rules,
decisional framing, and information disclosure-in order to nudge
people into better choices.116 Although it recognizes that human
behavioral failures may require regulation, libertarian paternalism
allows only "weak and nonintrusive" interventions and expressly
disclaims any means that completely block individual choice.117
A team of scholars led by Colin Camerer embraces a similar
but distinct approach, termed "asymmetric paternalism," which
strives to regulate only when it "creates large benefits for those who
make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully
rational."118 Asymmetric paternalism is explicitly motivated by a
concern that paternalistic policies "impose undue burdens on those
people who are behaving rationally."119  Policy tools like direct
mandates are thus disfavored because of their potential negative
effects on rational actors. Accordingly, asymmetric paternalism's
proposed regulatory policies are primarily changes to default rules,
increased information disclosure, or "cooling off' periods.120
Recently, Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes have critiqued BLE's
exclusive emphasis on soft paternalism to the exclusion of traditional
regulatory tools. 1 2 1 Taking BLE on its own terms, they observe that
the hard paternalism of direct bans or mandates may be the optimal
policy response to some behavioral market failures. In particular, the
soft paternalism of changes to default rules or information disclosure
is, in important cases, less likely to be effective than an outright
mandate.122 Information disclosure is frequently ineffective because of
the same behavioral failures that motivated the rule in the first place:
individuals' bounded rationality and willpower.123 Changes to default
rules, such as a move to an opt-out system, can end up as poorly
designed de facto mandates.124 At the least, a full analysis should
116. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 109, at 1160-66; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 110, at 1-8 (defining "libertarian paternalism").
117. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 109, at 1162.
118. Camerer et al., supra note 109, at 1212.
119. Id. at 1214.
120. See id. at 1224-47.
121. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 114, at 1595-600.
122. See id. at 1607-77 (reviewing examples of retirement savings, consumer credit, and
fuel economy).
123. Id. at 1598 ("Fuller, simpler, and more effective disclosure, one of the main options
in BLE's arsenal, is often not a realistic way to adequately rectify individual incapacity to make
accurate, informed judgments based on the appropriate time horizons.").
124. Id. at 1616-30 (showing that switch to opt-out retirement savings programs actually
reduced total savings for many employees).
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consider the costs and benefits of regulatory tools such as mandates,
bans, and taxes, in addition to the preferred tools of soft BLE.
12 5
Retirement savings policy illustrates this debate between soft
and hard BLE and suggests that hard paternalistic policy tools can
sometimes be optimal responses to humans' boundedly rational
behavior. Traditional retirement programs like Social Security and
defined-benefit pensions were largely choice-limiting and
paternalistic.1 2 6 Beginning in the 1970s, there was a move toward
defined contribution plans such as individual retirement accounts and
401(k) programs.127  The government offered a series of
incentives-principally in the form of tax deductions-designed to
encourage individuals to save.128  Consistent with humans'
shortsighted and boundedly rational nature, few people actually saved
enough despite these significant incentives.
129
Soft BLE scholars advocated reforming the choice architecture
such that individuals were enrolled in employer retirement programs
by default.130  As expected, the switch to an opt-out system
significantly increased the rate of participation in retirement
programs.131 Perversely, however, the switch actually decreased the
total amount of money saved by many employees.132 More people
125. See id. at 1601 ("We are arguing for a full comparison of the advantages and
disadvantages of different regulatory instruments. In particular, from a welfarist perspective,
there should be no presumption or precommitment in favor of choice-preserving regulatory
options over others.").
126. Id. at 1607; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 101, at 1121.
127. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 114, at 1607.
128. 26 U.S.C. § 219 (2012) (providing tax deduction for "qualified retirement
contributions"); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 101, at 1121 ("[T]he government provides billions of
dollars of tax incentives each year to encourage individuals to invest even more of their incomes
in retirement savings accounts, such as IRAs . . . .").
129. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 114, at 1630-32 ("[Mlost individuals are passive
savers who do not respond to tax incentives to save. For the 17 [percent] who do, it turns out that
these government subsidies do not change their overall savings rate because they offset
contributions to subsidized accounts by reducing their savings in other forms."); James J. Choi et
al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least
Resistance, in 16 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 67, 72 (James M. Poterba ed., 2002),
http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0863.pdf [https://perma.ccl3GGQ-W7V3] (survey results showing
that most people believe their own retirement savings to be inadequate).
130. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 110, at 105-20 (urging changes in default rules to
encourage greater retirement saving).
131. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 129, at 74-78 (finding that automatic enrollment
increases participation rates in employer retirement programs by approximately.fifty percentage
points); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k)
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1159-60 (2001) (automatic enrollment
increased participation rates from 37 percent to 86 percent).
132. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 114, at 1609, 1618-19 ("[T]he much-heralded
automatic enrollment approach appears not only to have failed to address meaningfully the
retirement savings problem but also to have exacerbated it. Perversely, in practice these
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participated, but they did so only at the low default rate (often 3 or 4
percent); under the old opt-in system, fewer employees participated,
but when they did so, they tended to choose a much higher savings
rate (7.5 percent on average).133
The soft BLE approach to retirement savings is thus revealed
as a disappointment from both the libertarian and paternalist
perspectives. For libertarians, opt-out systems preserve only the
illusion of choice. For the vast majority who simply go along with the
default, it functions as a de facto mandate. It is far from clear why
this should satisfy those philosophically committed to individual
freedom.134 For paternalists, the policy failed because it was a poorly
designed mandate. Many of those who went along with the default
likely presumed that they were "covered" by the program, when in
reality the savings rate was far too low for most workers. Worse,
there is every reason to believe that many of those who did opt out did
so for the very shortsighted reasons that the policy was intended to
ameliorate.135 A well-designed direct mandate would, in theory, more
effectively encourage retirement savings with fewer social costs.13 6
This policy comes full circle to embrace a hard paternalistic approach,
urging a retirement program that operates by a direct mandate, like
Social Security.137
C. Analogies to Copyright Law
The account of human behavior presented by BLE raises
provocative questions about copyright law. There are notable
comparisons between American copyright law and retirement savings
policy. Both are premised on the idea of the government encouraging
programs appear to reduce overall retirement savings, even as they raise the rates of
participation.").
133. Id. at 1622-24.
134. Indeed, many committed libertarians have developed critiques of libertarian
paternalism along these lines. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an
Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1245, 1246-47 (2005) (arguing that libertarian paternalism fails to
justify its choice of welfare over liberty); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case
for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2003) (arguing that libertarian paternalism fails
to account for the full costs of constraining choice); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1033, 1069-70 (2012) (arguing that libertarian paternalism neglects the process value
of liberty).
135. Cf. Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1181-85 (finding that, in credit overdraft context, the people who opt out are frequently those
that would most benefit from the default rule).
136. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 114, at 1625-27, 1632-33.
137. Id. at 1625-37 (arguing that the "hard paternalistic policy of an explicitly
mandatory savings program" may be a more effective way to encourage retirement savings).
438 [Vol. XIX:3:415
2017] COPYRIGHT PATERNALISM 439
a particular socially desirable behavior: artistic creation in the case of
copyright and saving for the future in the case of retirement policy.
Both relied primarily on traditional (if indirect) economic incentives to
encourage this desired behavior. Empirically, both saw a lackluster
response to those economic incentives, at least in part as a result of
behavioral effects.138
Like many retirement savings systems, copyright law has
recently shifted from an opt-in to an opt-out approach. The 1909
Copyright Act and preceding laws provided copyright to authors only
upon compliance with certain formalities, such as registering the
work.139  Though this system provided an economic incentive to
authors to create, in practice, relatively few authors took advantage.
In fact, most authors did not bother to assert copyright in their eligible
works, and even those who did rarely bothered to renew their
copyright.140 A lack of salience may explain some of this phenomenon,
or it may be simply that most artistic works were not valuable enough
to make it worthwhile to claim copyright.141 However, beginning with
the 1976 Act, copyright moved toward an opt-out system-copyright
was granted to authors by default the moment that the work was
written down.142
The relevance of behavioral economics to copyright, however,
goes well beyond the comparison between copyright and retirement
policy. 1 4 3 As will become clear, there are many behavioral phenomena
138. Of course, the analogy is imperfect in that, in the case of retirement savings, people
do not save enough despite the incentive, whereas in copyright the evidence suggests that
creators will often create anyway, regardless of the incentive. In both cases, there is a non-
response to incentives, albeit in opposite directions.
139. See generally Sprigman, supra note 67, at 49.1-94 (reviewing history of formalities
required by early American copyright law); infra Section IV.C.
140. See Sprigman, supra note 67, at 520 (citing studies showing only a minority of
published works were registered and less than 20 percent renewed).
141. See id. at 514 (explaining that copyright owners would not comply with formalities
"if the costs of protection exceeded the expected revenues from copyrighting").
142. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .");
Sprigman, supra note 67, at 487-88. This shift away from required formalities became complete
with the United States' adoption of the Berne Convention Implementation Act in 1988. See
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
143. Some important work has applied BLE to copyright, though it is fair to say the
application of behavioral economics to copyright is in its early stages. See, e.g., Christopher
Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011)
(providing experimental evidence that endowment effect is exacerbated by the fact of creation in
addition to ownership); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual
Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (providing experimental evidence in
support of the endowment effect for intellectual creators); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (2010) (concluding that protectability standards in
patent and copyright law accord with psychological findings on creativity); Avishalom Tor &
Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a 'ifetime-Plus-Years" Copyright Duration: Lessons
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that may affect artistic creation and dissemination. Because these
effects do not always cut in the same direction, it is difficult to predict
their overall significance a priori. Like human behavior itself, the
reality is complicated and will certainly depend on context.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to understand these failings in order to
understand the role that paternalism does-and could-play in
American copyright law. As explained below, many paternalistic
interventions in copyright appear to be motivated by these behavioral
effects.
What are the specific behavioral failures that might apply to
artistic creation and dissemination? Broadly speaking, behavioral
failures come into play during two separate stages in the life of a
copyrighted work. The first stage relates to creation of the work: how
humans respond, if at all, to copyright and other incentives to create.
The second stage relates to the potential assignment of the work.
Authors commonly license or assign their rights to intermediaries
such as publishers, and there are sound economic reasons to do so.14 4
Here, the behavioral effects concern whether authors are acting
rationally in their assignments and if society is satisfied with the
distributive consequences of these transfers.
The creation stage relates to copyright's efficacy as an
incentive. The most important behavioral effect is the phenomenon of
intrinsic motivation. Many individuals engage in acts of creation for
reasons of challenge, impulse, self-actualization, or simple
enjoyment-regardless of the extrinsic incentive.145 Moreover, there is
evidence suggesting that offering economic incentives can sometimes
"crowd out" intrinsic motivation and thus be detrimental to
creativity.146
If copyright did not carry significant social costs, granting
copyright to intrinsically motivated individuals would not present any
particular problem. However, granting copyright is costly. Most
obviously, copyright makes artistic works more expensive, reducing
consumption of artistic works and access to them.147 Copyright can
from A Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 437 (2002)
(arguing that bounded rationality accounts for copyright's life-based duration scheme).
144. Barnett, supra note 19, at 401-02.
145. See supra Section II.B.
146. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text; see also Gregory N. Mandel, To
Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2000 (2011) ("Experimental cognitive research also reveals that
intrinsic motivation is highly conducive to creative productivity, while purely extrinsic
motivation tends to decrease creative function.").
147. See generally, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 22-24; Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 313-21 (1970) (describing benefits to readers of
lower prices, wider distribution, and expanded access were copyright in books abolished);
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hinder creativity by reducing the public domain sources that later
creators can draw upon or use as raw materials to create new
works.148 According to the incentive model's account, the reason that
we impose these costs is the corresponding benefit of increased artistic
creation as a result of the copyright incentive. This benefit is absent
when copyright does not actually operate as an incentive. It is
therefore a serious concern that copyrights are being granted to many
individuals who did not need them as an incentive to create.
Another behavioral influence on incentives to create is the
human difficulty with judgments under uncertainty. Copyright does
not directly guarantee authors any economic return; instead, the
reward is dependent on success in the marketplace.149 Furthermore,
artistic creation is a "hits market": most creation is of limited
commercial value, but some is extremely valuable, and the value of
artistic work prior to exploitation is usually unpredictable.
15 0 The
behavioral effects here point in opposite directions. On the one hand,
consistent with the notion of bounded willpower, authors may discount
the mere possibility of an uncertain future reward, which would
undermine the efficacy of copyright as an incentive.151 Moreover,
individuals may respond weakly to indirect incentives like copyright,
which are often ignored for lack of salience or because authors are
simply unaware of them.152  On the other hand, humans can
systematically overestimate small probabilities, creating a potential
"lottery effect," whereby the low-probability possibility of a big reward
induces over-investment in creation.153 Thus, although the chance of
commercial success is small for most artistic works, authors may
overestimate the likelihood of a great reward from their work.
154
Behavioral effects are also in play at the time of copyright
assignment. This stage relates to an author's decision to license or
Thomas B. Macaulay, Sec'y at War, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841),
in MACAULAY: PROSE AND POETRY (1952), http://homepages.law.asu.edul-dkarjala
/OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary[MacaulaySpeeches.html [https://perma.cc/4UF3
-8SPA]) (noting that the effect of the copyright monopoly "is to make articles scarce, to make
them dear, and to make them bad").
148. See generally, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS
OF THE MIND 123-59 (2008); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 66-70; LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FREE CULTURE 21-47 (2003).
149. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
150. See Barnett, supra note 19, at 398-99.
151. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text (explaining bounded willpower).
152. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (explaining framing and salience
effects).
153. Cf. Dennis Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 141-45 (2008) (observing, in patent context,
evidence that creators overestimate the chance that their inventions will be successful).
154. See Barnett, supra note 19, at 398-99.
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transfer the copyright in her artistic work-typically to an
intermediary such as a publisher or record company. As explained in
the next Part, many of the paternalistic interventions in copyright are
motivated by a perception that authors lack bargaining power in this
negotiation. 155
Behavioral theory offers several possible reasons for the
perceived imbalance in bargaining power. The most prominent effect
is bounded willpower. Humans tend to be very present-biased and
shortsighted, pursuing immediate gratification at the expense of long-
term interests.15 6  Bounded willpower thus creates concern that
authors will discount the possibility of future revenue, such as
royalties, to sell their rights for a minimal upfront payment. This
view accords with a popular perception that artists "are so sorely
pressed for funds that they are willing to sell their work for a mere
pittance."157 Indeed, copyright history abounds with anecdotes to this
effect: for example, the creators of Superman sold away their rights in
the character for $130.158 Such stories appear to be one motivation for
copyright's termination provisions.15 9
Even if the initial copyright assignment was a result of fair and
equal bargaining, however, it may offend people's social preferences.
Humans often prefer allocation of goods that equalize welfare gains as
opposed to ones that maximize total social welfare.160 These fairness
preferences roughly accord with Rawlsian notions of distributive
justice.161 Specifically, when dividing up goods, people tend to follow a
so-called "maxmin" criterion, which maximizes the position of the
least-advantaged individual.162 As applied to copyright assignments,
people may object to the creators of Superman receiving only $130, not
because the bargaining was unequal, but simply because the outcome
155. See infra Part V.
156. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
157. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943). But see
infra note 194 and accompanying text (questioning this "starving artist" narrative). See generally
Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and
Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 399-400 (2010) (describing
termination rights as motivated by "a pattern" wherein "artists conveyed away their copyright
interests in a work for a comparatively small sum and did not share in the resulting profits when
the work later proved to be commercially valuable").
158. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
159. See infra Section IV.A (explaining termination of transfers and its paternalistic
motivations).
160. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., M.E. Yaari & M. Bar-Hillel, On Dividing Justly, 1 Soc. CHOICE &
WELFARE 1, 6-10 (1984).
162. Id.; see also Rabin, supra note 95, at 18-19.
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is unfair. Social preferences thus provide an additional motivation for
protecting authors from one-sided assignments of copyright.
Cutting in the opposite direction is the endowment effect.
People overvalue goods that are initially allocated to them.
16 3 In a
series of famous experiments, researchers randomly gave coffee mugs
to half of a group of students, who then participated in a market.
164
Those who did not receive a mug were asked how much they would be
willing to pay to buy one; those receiving mugs were asked how much
they would accept to sell, and trades were executed when the offers
exceeded the asking price.165 Although traditional economic theory
would predict that about half of the mugs would change hands, in
practice, few trades took place because the owners of the mugs
systematically overvalued them relative to prospective "buyers." In
one study, for example, the average mug owner was unwilling to sell
for less than $7.12, whereas the average buyer offered only $2.87.166
In the intellectual property context, because copyright usually
vests initially in a work's creator, authors may value their own works
more than potential purchasers because of the endowment effect.
Indeed, recent studies by Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher
Sprigman support the existence of a "creativity effect" whereby
creators overvalue their work relative to potential purchasers.
167 The
creativity effect means that authors may be less willing to sell their
work than traditional economic analysis predicts.
Table 1. Selected Behavioral Effects in Artistic Creation and
Assignment
STAGE BEHAVIORAL EFFECT POTENTIAL IMPACT
Intrinsic motivation Fail to respond to economic
incentives
Salience Fail to respond to indirect
Creation incentives
Lottery effect Over-estimate probability of artistic
work's success
163. See Rabin, supra note 95, at 14.
164. Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194-95 (1991).
165. Id. at 195-96.
166. See id. at 196.
167. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 143 (experimental evidence of endowment
and creativity effects for creators of intellectual property).
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Bounded willpower Assign away future revenue for
(small) immediate payment
Assignment Social preferences Disfavor one-sided transfers
Endowment effect Overvalue own artistic creation
IV. PATERNALISM IN COPYRIGHT LAW
What lessons does the increasing embrace of paternalism by
BLE scholars have for copyright law? As an initial matter, it is
important to observe that American copyright law is not consistent in
its view of authors as rational actors. Despite the dominance of the
incentive model, many aspects of American copyright law are best
understood as motivated by paternalism. To a surprising degree, the
law provides protection for authors who, it supposes, are not fully
capable of protecting their own interests. These provisions include
authors' rights to terminate transfers, a number of limitations on
copyright alienability, and the elimination of formalities.168 This Part
explains these aspects of copyright law and argues that paternalism is
a natural way to understand these provisions.
To be sure, many of the provisions described in this Part are
motivated by multiple factors. The congressional intent behind these
laws is often contested or unreliable, as copyright lawmaking is
characterized by messy-some would say unprincipled-compromises
among interest groups.16 9 Whether motivated by a perception. of
authors as shortsighted or simply lacking bargaining power, the
overall effect of these provisions is to protect authors from the
consequences of their actions by limiting their choices, and therefore
168. This list is by no means exclusive. Other important aspects of copyright that can be
understood as paternalistic in operation include moral rights for visual artists, see 17 U.S.C. §
106A (2012), which grant visual artists protection against misattribution or modification of their
work even if they have sold the work to another without any express restriction, and the many
compulsory license provisions, see, e.g., id. §§ 111(d), 114(d)(2), 115, 118, which effectively dictate
that an author must license certain uses and the terms at which they must do so, see also infra
notes 311-314 and accompanying text (discussing compulsory licenses). A number of proposed
copyright revisions have important paternalistic aspects as well, such as proposals for resale
royalties. See generally American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong. (2014); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS (2013),
http://copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQB9-SVS3].
169. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860-61 (1987) (reviewing the "troubling" legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act and concluding that it represents not congressional deliberation but a
"complicated and delicate compromise" among industry representatives).
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these laws fit the definition of paternalism as used herein.170 Such
copyright-specific protections go far beyond the usual contractual
protections such as duress or unconscionability, and they apply
regardless of whether there was any actual bargaining imbalance.
These provisions are thus in tension with the strictly rational author
supposed by the incentive model.
A. Termination of Transfers
The right to terminate copyright transfers is one of the more
complex features of American copyright law, and some history is
necessary to understand its design. Since the earliest American
copyright law, the author has retained a reversionary interest in her
copyright.171 Historically, this reversionary interest was structured as
a renewal term: the 1909 Copyright Act, for example, granted to
authors an initial twenty-eight-year term of copyright, followed by an
additional. twenty-eight-year term should she choose to renew the
copyright.172 Because the renewal term was considered a "new estate,"
the rights vested in the author even if she had transferred the original
copyright.173 Congress reasoned that renewal rights were necessary
because "[i]t not infrequently happens that the author sells his
copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the
work proves to be a great success . . . [the Committee] felt that it
should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal
term."174
A 1943 Supreme Court ruling significantly altered this
structure. In Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, the Court
held that authors were free to assign away their future renewal rights
during the initial copyright term.175 Justice Frankfurter's majority
170. See supra note 112 (defining paternalism as governmental or other actors limiting
the choices of individuals in order to protect them from the consequences of their own decisions).
171. The reversionary interest can be traced back to the original copyright statute: "[T]he
sole Right of Printing or Disposing of Copies shall Return to the Authors thereof, if they are then
Living, for another Term of Fourteen Years." See British Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19
(emphasis added). See generally R. Anthony Reese, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two
Perspectives on Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707, 727 n.91 (1995)
(reviewing early history of reversion rights).
172. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81. If the
copyright was not renewed, the work would fall into the public domain. See Sprigman, supra note
67, at 493.
173. See Reese, supra note 171, at 727 ("[R]ather than merely extending the duration of
the original copyright, [renewal] granted a 'new estate,' in the terminology of some courts, to the
author or her designated successors.").
174. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909).
175. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943).
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opinion invoked the freedom of contract and mocked the claim that
Congress intended renewal to protect authors:
The policy of the copyright law, we are told, is to protect the author-if need be,
from himself-and a construction under which the author is powerless to assign
his renewal interest furthers this policy. We are asked to recognize that authors
are congenitally irresponsible, that frequently they are so sorely pressed for funds
that they are willing to sell their work for a mere pittance, and therefore
assignments made by them should not be upheld....
If an author cannot make an effective assignment of his renewal, it may be
worthless to him when he is most in need. Nobody would pay an author for
something he cannot sell. We cannot draw a principle of law from the familiar
stories of garret-poverty of some men of literary genius.176
The Fred Fisher holding undermined the practical effectiveness
of the renewal term as a benefit for authors, as it became common
practice for publishers to demand that authors assign the future
renewal rights in any deal. 177
Despite Justice Frankfurter's dismissal of a congressional
intent to protect "irresponsible" authors, Congress clarified in the
1976 Copyright Act that this was more or less what it had in mind.178
In 1976, Congress replaced the renewal system with a unitary
copyright term.179 In place of renewal, the 1976 Act granted authors
or their heirs an inalienable right to terminate (i.e., to rescind) prior
agreements transferring the copyright in their works.180
More specifically, section 203 of the 1976 Act permits an author
to terminate a contract transferring or licensing his copyright when
the initial transfer was made after 1978, the effective date of the
Act.181 The termination must be made within a five-year window
176. Id. at 656-57.
177. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 185 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)
("This right of renewal was intended to allow an author who had underestimated the value of his
creation at the outset to reap some of the rewards of its eventual success. That purpose, however,
was substantially thwarted by this Court's decision in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark &
Sons."); STmFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 53 (Comm. Print 1961)
[hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION] ("It has become a common practice for publishers and
others to take advance assignments of future renewal rights.").
178. See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-poohing Copyright Law's "Inalienable"
Termination Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 799, 805 (2010) (describing the 1976 revision as
a congressional "override" of Fred Fisher); Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 172-73 ("[The termination
right [of the 1976 Act] was expressly intended to relieve authors of the consequences of
ill-advised and unremunerative grants .... ).
179. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-73 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)).
180. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2012); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)
("The 1976 Copyright Act provides a single, fixed term, but provides an inalienable termination
right.").
181. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)-(b).
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beginning thirty-five years after the date of the original agreement.
182
Section 304 applies to grants of renewal rights executed prior to
1978.183 In that case, the termination must be effectuated in a
five-year window beginning fifty-six years from the date that the
copyright was initially secured.184 Under both provisions, works made
for hire and grants made via will are not terminable.185 Procedurally,
an author must serve a written advance notice upon the original
grantee asserting her termination right.1
86 If the author died, the
termination rights passed to a series of statutorily designated heirs
(e.g., the author's surviving spouse or children).
1 87
In short, the 1976 Act provides authors with the right to revoke
an initial transfer or license of copyright, decades after that contract
was made, "notwithstanding any agreement to contrary."
188 In plain
language, an author who signed away her rights to a publisher or
record company can sometimes get her copyright back. The rationale
behind the termination right is disputed.1
89 The main account asserts
182. Id. § 203(a)(3). In the case of a grant covering the publication of the work, the period
begins thirty-five years from the date of publication. Id.
183. Id. § 304(c).
184. Id. § 304(c)(3).
185. Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c).
186. Id. §§ 203(a)(4), 304(c)(4).
187. Id. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2). These statutory heirs represent a second way in which the
termination of transfers provisions are paternalistic. Because the ownership of the termination
right is dictated by the statute, authors are not free to alter this inheritance structure by will.
See Brad Greenberg, DOMA's Ghost and Copyright Reversionary Interests, 108 Nw. U. L. REV.
391, 396-97 (describing the designation of statutory heirs as a "restraint on testamentary
freedom" that can "produce property dispositions contrary to an author's intent, even when the
author executed a will"). Thus, for example, an author who wishes to bequeath termination
rights to his brother or stepchild instead of his surviving spouse cannot do so. See id.; Melville B.
Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947,
967-68 (1977). This inheritance structure favors the author's surviving spouse and children and
likely derives from the historical motive for renewal rights as a means of subsistence for an
author's surviving family. See infra note 197.
188. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5).
189. Compare, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Worst Part of Copyright: Termination of
Transfers, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 14, 2012), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/201
2 /02
/theworst-part-of-copyright-termination-of-transfers.html [https://perma.cc/6W4Q-ENVZ]
("Termination of transfers rests instead on a view that authors are 'congenitally irresponsible' to
the point that they can't be trusted to make licensing decisions for themselves."), with Lydia
Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the "Inalienable" Right to
Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2010) ("Many believe that Congress based the
[termination] policy on a paternalistic desire to protect creative individuals lacking business
acumen. This Article demonstrates that Congress was much more concerned with the valuation
problem inherent in creative works."). The rationale is also slightly different for section 304
terminations as opposed to section 203 terminations. Section 304 covers rights-an ex post
copyright term extension-that neither the original author or the grantee would have
anticipated in the original contract. For these rights, Congress decided that the term extension
"windfall" ought to go to authors. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 140 (1976) ("The arguments for
granting rights of termination are even more persuasive under § 304 than they are under § 203;
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that termination is necessary because of authors' generally weak
bargaining power in the initial transfer, either because of a lack of
business savvy, the market power of publishers, or
shortsightedness.1 9 0 Termination is thus "intended to relieve authors
of the consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative grants."191 This
account was invoked rhetorically by Justice Frankfurter in Fred
Fisher, and it is still often cited.192
However, the bargaining power account suffers from a few
weaknesses. First, it is only partially supported by the legislative
history, which also invokes the problem of uncertainty in the
valuation of artistic works.193 Second, it rests on questionable factual
presumptions of authors as romantic "starving artists."194 Finally and
most fundamentally, termination rights as structured in the 1976 Act
do not actually do anything to improve the bargaining position of most
authors.19  Instead, termination actually weakens the initial
bargaining position for the majority of authors to the benefit of the
tiny minority who create works that are still valuable thirty-five years
(or more) down the road.196
the extended term represents a completely new property right, and there are strong reasons for
giving the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of copyright under the Constitution, an
opportunity to share in it.").
190. See Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in
Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 79 (2013) ("The main historical justification for
inalienable profit-sharing arrangements is heavily rooted in a romantic notion of the starving
artist. The argument is that artists are so poor, weak, unsophisticated, and stressed, and thus in
such a 'poor bargaining position' [vis-A-vis publishers].").
191. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985).
192. See Loren, supra note 189, at 1346 (2010) ("The image of authors as poor
businessmen continues to affect courts' understanding of the termination rights."); supra notes
175-177 and accompanying text.
193. See Reese, supra note 171, at 733 ('Thus, the 1976 Act's drafters [explained that
termination] was premised not on a perception of authors as poor businesspeople, but on a
perception of creative works as inherently difficult to value before exploitation in the market.");
accord Loren, supra note 189, at 329. But see COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 177, at 54
(noting, as a reason for termination provisions, that "most authors are not represented by
protective organizations and are in a relatively poor bargaining position").
194. See Rub, supra note 190, at 81-87 (arguing that the "starving artist myth" lacks
factual support).
195. See id. at 83-84 ("Termination rights ... do not seem to effectively address the
poverty of artists."); id. at 86 ("[E]ven if the concern of unequal sophistication and experience
level requires legal intervention, solutions should focus on the time of negotiation.").
196. See Kate Darling, Occupy Copyright: A Law & Economic Analysis of U.S. Author
Termination Rights, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 150 (2015) ("[Ilntroducing a termination right will
effect price changes and risk allocation, essentially creating a lottery that rewards a small subset
of authors, but reducing individual gains for the majority."); Grimmelmann, supra note 189
("[Termination] bestows large windfalls on a very small number of [authors], at immense
administrative cost."); Loren, supra note 189, at 1352-53 ("[T]ermination rights will be exercised
only for very successful works with commercial staying power," and "[i]f the bargained for price
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A second rationale for termination, more firmly grounded in
the legislative history, relies on the uncertainty in determining the
value of an artistic work before it is exploited.197 As the 1976 House
committee report stated, termination "is needed because of the
unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the
impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been
exploited."198 This explanation, however, is not a fully persuasive
account of the termination right. To be sure, there is great
unpredictability in the value of artistic works,199 but this uncertainty
is shared by both authors and publishers.200 Moreover, a rational
author would want to transfer this risk to the publisher, who, as a
holder of a diverse portfolio of works, is much better suited to bear
it.201 All termination accomplishes, on this account, is to reallocate
some of the risk back to the author and make the initial assignment of
copyright less valuable when authors sell it to publishers.20
2 Indeed, if
an author wishes to share the risk presented by uncertain valuation
with the publisher, royalty arrangements are an easy way to
accomplish this by contract.203
Regardless of which rationale one accepts, termination rights
are paternalistic because they operate to protect the author from the
consequences of his own contracting decisions. The two accounts
for the transfers includes a discount for the possibility of termination, then unsuccessful authors
may be suffering at the cost of extremely successful ones.").
197. Although less frequently cited, early legislative history of renewal offers a third
rationale: support for the author's family after his death. See 7 REG. DEB. at exix (1831) ("[Should
the author die,] his family stand in more need of the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to
them."). This intent is clearly present in termination's mandatory statutory beneficiaries, which
override any heirs that the author specifies by will. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2) (2012).
The family support rationale tends to be rarely cited today, perhaps given its origin in discarded
gender roles.
198. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
199. See generally Barnett, supra note 19, 398-44 (arguing that creative markets are
characterized by a high risk of commercial failure).
200. See Rub, supra note 190, at 87-88 ("[I]t is unclear why [valuation problems] should
justify a termination mechanism, especially an inalienable one. From an economic perspective,
prior to commercialization the work might be a risky investment. It is risky for the seller, but it
is similarly risky for the buyer.").
201. See Darling, supra note 196, at 202 ("mhe uncertain future value of artistic works
makes it in the author's interest to allocate the risk of success or failure to the publisher. It is
one of the reasons why publishers exist in the first place."); Rub, supra note 190, at 87-88
(arguing that it is "socially efficient" to transfer the risk to the publisher because the
"intermediary's portfolio typically includes many artists, and thus the aggregate risk it faces is
considerably smaller").
202. Darling, supra note 196, at 165-66.
203. See Grimmelmann, supra note 189 ("The uncertain valuation problem can be
addressed with better contract drafting."); Nimmer, supra note 187, at 950 ("[The uncertain
valuation account] is somewhat less persuasive when the original sale is on a percentage royalty
basis so that the author automatically shares in whatever returns his or her work may bring.").
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merely differ in the reason that the state offers this protection. On the
weak bargaining power account, paternalism is perhaps more obvious:
this rationale presumes a shortsighted, unsophisticated, or ill-advised
author that must be protected from foolishly signing away his rights
for a pittance. In the language of BLE, such an author suffers from
bounded willpower and difficulties with probabilistic judgments.
Paternalism of a different sort is present on the uncertain valuation
account, however. If we presume that the author is rational and
facing uncertainty as to whether his creation will be a valuable "hit"
or a flop, there are strong reasons why he would want to transfer this
risk to the publisher in return for other compensation.204
Termination, by mandating that the author cannot transfer all of the
valuation risk, thus overrides the preferences of some authors in a
paternalistic fashion.205
There is also a tension with the incentive model's vision of the
author on either account of termination. Again, this tension is clear
on the weak bargaining power rationale. If authors are so
shortsighted that they cannot effectively bargain in the highly
economic context of a negotiation, it is fair to question how responsive
they are to copyright's incentive to create. In other words, if authors
make bad deals because they discount the possible future revenue
from their work, it seems unlikely that this same future revenue was
the reason for the work's creation.206 A parallel conflict arises on the
uncertain valuation rationale. If authors are unable to effectively
value their own works, this unpredictability undermines the original
copyright incentive. How powerful is the incentive to create if it can
only give an author a small chance of a highly uncertain future
reward?207 It is thus rather implausible that termination rights could
provide any additional incentive to create. Termination will only
benefit the very few authors whose work remains successful thirty-five
years after creation. If valuation is uncertain, these authors have no
clear idea ex ante whether they will be one of the lucky few.
204. See Rub, supra note 190, at 63.
205. See Reese, supra note 171, at 736 ('The rationale offered for reversion in both 1909
and 1976 was the perceived need to protect authors from their disadvantageous bargaining
position relative to copyright purchasers. [A libertarian] should view this rationale for reversion
as wholly illegitimate, for he clearly rejects such paternalism.").
206. Grimmelmann, supra note 189 ("As an incentive for authorship, [termination is] a
terrible one. If authors make bad up-front deals because they're unmindful of future revenues, it
follows that those same future revenues won't operate as an ex ante incentive for creativity.").
207. Cf. Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 38 ("[R]ecent studies make it quite clear that
modern creators generally have little more realistic hope than Victorian poets of earning much in
the way of remuneration for their acts of creation."). However, the behavioral lottery effect




Termination rights, at best, only offer a highly uncertain and oddly
structured incentive.208
B. Limitations on Alienability
Copyright law limits authors' ability to transfer their copyright
in a number of ways beyond the termination right. For example,
assignments of exclusive rights cannot be made orally or implied
through conduct. For purposes of whether a work can be treated as
"made for hire" (and therefore belonging to an employer), copyright
imposes limits on who can be deemed an employee, and which types of
commissioned works can be designated as made for hire by contract.
Finally, some courts take a restrictive view as to whether an author
can assign rights in media not yet developed at the time of the initial
transfer of copyright. This Section reviews these subtler, but
nonetheless important and paternalistic limitations on the alienability
of copyright.
1. The Writing Requirement for Copyright Transfers
Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act provides that any transfer
of ownership of copyright must be "in writing and signed by the owner
of the rights."209 Although this is sometimes described as a "statute of
frauds" for copyright, its language and effect is broader.
210 Rather
than merely requiring a writing as evidence of an agreement,
unwritten copyright assignments are simply "not valid."
211
Copyright's requirement of a signed writing has therefore been
characterized as an "absolute" or "super" statute of frauds.
212
Traditional exceptions to the statute of frauds, such as estoppel, do not
208. Darling, supra note 196, at 150 ("[Ulncertainty, the length of copyright terms, and
the long time period between right assignments and the termination possibility may mitigate the
potential for positive effects on creation incentives.").
209. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012). The statutory definition makes clear that the writing
requirement includes any whole or partial "transfer" of exclusive rights, but does not apply to a
"nonexclusive license," which can be made orally. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Effects Assocs. v.
Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).
210. Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, 794 F. Supp. 933, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("Section 204(a)
is analogous to a statute of frauds . . .
211. 17 U.S.C § 204(a).
212. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:106 (2010) ("The writing requirement
is absolute, admitting of no exception."); Victor H. Polk, Jr. & Joshua M. Dalton, Equitable
Defenses to the Invocation of the Copyright Act's Statute of Frauds Provision, 46 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y USA 603, 608 (1998) (noting that "the courts ... have turned Section 204(a) into a 'super'
statute of frauds," but criticizing this interpretation).
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apply.2 13 Some courts go so far as to reject a writing confirming a
transfer of copyright if that writing was not "contemporaneous" with
the transfer.214
The purpose of section 204(a) is also broader than that of a
typical statute of frauds. Like a statute of frauds, section 204(a) is
designed to provide protection for the author from fraudulent claims of
transfer and to promote predictability and certainty in copyright
ownership.215  But section 204(a) is also designed to prevent
inadvertent transfers of copyright by the author, whether fraudulent
or not.2 1 6  The statute is therefore not a neutral evidentiary
requirement; it is designed to operate "in favor of the original holder of
the copyrighted material."2 17  In other words, the "purpose of the
writing requirement is thus to effectuate a congressional policy of
protecting authors, even from themselves if need be."2 1 8
2. Limitations on "Works Made for Hire"
Congress also attempted to protect authors from inadvertent or
unwanted loss of rights in the Copyright Act's "work made for hire"
provisions. The usual rule for copyright ownership is that, upon
creation, the copyright vests in the author. However, when a work is
"made for hire" the copyright vests initially in the "employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared."219 The Act specifies "two
mutually exclusive means" by which a work can be designated as
made for hire: one for employees and one for independent
contractors.220 For employees, the person creating the work must be a
true employee under agency law, and the work must be "within the
scope of his or her employment."2 2 1
213. Pamfiloff, 794 F. Supp. at 937 (holding that equitable estoppel does not apply to
section 204(a)).
214. See Konigsberg Int'l Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that to
satisfy section 204(a), a writing must be "executed more or less contemporaneously with the
agreement"). But see Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 828-30 (3d Cir. 2011)
(rejecting the "contemporaneous" requirement).
215. Pamfiloff, 794 F. Supp. at 937 ("[We interpret Section 204(a) to provide protection
for the author and creator of copyrighted material against fraudulent claims of transfer.");
Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[S]ection 204 enhances predictability
and certainty of copyright ownership.").
216. Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 557 ("Section 204 ensures that the creator of a work will
not give away his copyright inadvertently ....
217. Pamfiloff, 794 F. Supp. at 937.
218. PATRY, supra note 212, § 5:106.
219. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (2012).
220. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989).
221. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1); Reid, 490 U.S. at 740-41 (holding that the term "employee" in
the work made for hire provisions is defined by the common law of agency).
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For independent contractors, the rules are much stricter.
These rules emerged as a response to some courts' broad
interpretation of the 1909 Copyright Act, which they read as
presumptively granting the copyright to a hiring party whenever a
work was created at his "instance and expense."
22 2 The courts applied
that test to employees and freelance artists alike, and required only
that the hiring party "induces the creation of the work and has the
right to direct and supervise the manner in which the work is carried
out."2 2 3 This rule threatened to presumptively transfer copyright to
the hiring party for almost all commissioned works, as these features
are present in most hiring relationships.22 4
As a result, the 1976 Act's "work made for hire" provisions put
specific requirements in place and restored some protection to
freelance authors. The new rule drew a sharp line between employees
and independent contractors and protects authors in two ways. First,
it requires that authors actually be "employees," not just so designated
by contract, for the first prong of the definition to apply.225 Second, for
commissioned works, it allows works to be designated as made for hire
by contract only in a narrow set of circumstances: (i) the work must be
"specially ordered or commissioned";226 (ii) it must be one of nine
specified types of works;227 and (iii) there must be a signed, written
agreement designating it as "made for hire."
22 8
The legislative history reveals that this provision was
motivated by a concern that "freelance authors lacked the bargaining
power to reject contractual clauses designating works as made for
222. Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1966);
Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965).
223. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d Cir. 2004). The history of the "instance and expense" test
reveals that it lacked much basis in law when it was created, see id. at 634 n.17, 634-35, and it
has been much criticized. See Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 139 n.8 (2d Cir.
2013) (acknowledging criticism).
224. See PATRY, supra note 212, § 5:48 ("[The instance-and-expense test] decisions were
on a fast track into turning all specially ordered or commissioned works presumptively into
works made for hire, and without any agreement between the parties, oral or written.").
225. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 742-43.
226. See Playboy v. Dumas, 55 F.3d 549, 561-62 (2d Cir. 1995).
227. The statute lists the types as "[1] a contribution to a collective work, [2] as a part of
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, [3] as a translation, [4] as a supplementary work, [5]
as a compilation, [6] as an instructional text, [7] as a test, [8] as answer material for a test, or [9]
as an atlas." 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (numbering added). "The unifying feature of these works is
that they are usually prepared at the instance, direction, and risk of a publisher or producer."
Reid, 490 U.S. at 741.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). This writing requirement serves similarly author-protective
functions as the general provision, section 204(a). See PATRY, supra note 212, § 5:48 ("The
principal purpose of the writing requirement for specially ordered or commissioned works is to
protect non-work-for-hire authors . . . ."); supra notes 215-217 and accompanying text.
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hire."229  For some categories of works, including most sound
recordings and literary works, the law simply does not allow freelance
creators to sign away their authorship rights.230 While this does not
prevent freelancers from transferring their copyright to the hiring
party, the creators remain the legal authors of the work and thus
retain the termination right, at least.2 3 1 The work made for hire
provisions are thus designed to protect authors from the expansive
1909 Act rule and serve "a pro-actively paternalistic function."232
3. Limitations on Transfers in New Media
A final limit on copyright alienability relates to whether an
author can assign rights to technologies not yet in existence when the
transfer is made. The issue is often called the "new-media problem" or
the "new-use problem."2 3 3 Despite the name, it is actually a very old
problem: past courts struggled, for example, to determine whether a
grant of rights in a silent film extended to "talkies," or whether rights
to distribute a motion picture extended to video cassettes and VCRs.2 34
Most American courts agree that unequivocal language granting
rights to "all technologies now known or later developed" will be
enforced.235 When the new medium of distributing a work is only
229. Litman, supra note 169, at 890; see also Marci Hamilton, Commissioned Works as
Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1281, 1311 (1987) ("The unequal bargaining position of the parties . . . and the
commissioning party's ability to dictate if and when work-made-for-hire contracts will be
imposed on the artist all combine to deprive freelance artists of fair compensation for their
works.").
230. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).
231. Even if he cannot use a contract to designate himself as the author, the hiring party
can of course demand that the artist transfer his copyright interest, so long as it is via a signed
written agreement. Id. § 204(a). However, unlike a true "work made for hire," the creator will
remain the original legal author and therefore be entitled to termination rights. Id. § 304(c). The
duration of the copyright will also be measured by different rules. Id. § 302(a), (c).
232. Corey Field, Their Master's Voice? Recording Artists, Bright Lines, and Bowie
Bonds: The Debate over Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire, 48 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y USA
145, 147 (2000).
233. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486
(2d Cir. 1998) ("Disputes about whether licensees may exploit licensed works through new
marketing channels made possible by technologies developed after the licensing contract-often
called 'new-use' problems-have vexed courts . ); PATRY, supra note 212, § 5:115 (reviewing
case law of the "new-media problem").
234. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[B]
nn.02-6 (reviewing history of the new-use problem).
235. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 346, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (agreement to distribute records "by any method now or hereafter known" includes digital
music rights); accord PATRY, supra note 212, § 5:115; Kate Darling, Contracting About the
Future: Copyright and New Media, 10 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 485, 489-91 (2012) ("[In
contrast to Europe,] the voluntary transfer of new use rights is neither forbidden nor
prohibitively restricted in the United States.").
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ambiguously covered by the contractual language, however, the courts
are in considerable conflict. For example, the Second Circuit was
recently called upon to address whether a 1961 license to distribute a
literary work "in book form" also granted rights to eBooks.
236
In the United States, there are two competing approaches to
the new media problem.237 Some courts, such as the Second Circuit,
treat the issue as purely "neutral" contract interpretation and will find
a grant of rights in new technologies whenever that is the more
reasonable reading of the contractual language.238 Other courts such
as the Ninth Circuit employ a pro-author presumption and will divest
authors of rights in new media only if the contract contains the
"clearest language."239 These courts follow, albeit in a weaker form,
the general rule in continental Europe, where many countries
categorically prohibit transfers of rights in future media or impose
strict requirements on such assignments.240
The courts that apply a pro-author presumption often invoke
the weak bargaining position of "impecunious" authors as the
rationale.241 In Cohen v. Paramount Pictures, for example, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that license agreements should be interpreted "in
accordance with the purposes underlying federal copyright law," which
it understood as "enacted for the benefit of the composer."
242 Given
this purpose, and the likelihood that neither party knew of the new
technology at the time of the original contract, the publisher "should
236. Random House v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 2002).
237. See Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486-87 (reviewing "two principal approaches" to new-use
issues); Darling, supra note 235, at 488-91 (same).
238. Boosey, 145 F.3d at 487 ("In our view, new-use analysis should rely on neutral
principles of contract interpretation rather than solicitude for either party . . . . What governs
under Bartsch is the language of the contract. If the contract is more reasonably read to convey
one meaning, [that meaning controls].").
239. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1954)
("Such doubt as there is should be resolved in favor of the composer. The clearest language is
necessary to divest the author from the fruit of.his labor."); see also Cohen v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988). Recently, the Ninth Circuit has walked back its pro-
author rule somewhat. Welles v. Turner Entm't Co., 505 F.3d 728, 735 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007)
(stating that there is no "presumption against applying a grant of right in 'motion pictures' to
new technologies").
240. See generally Darling, supra note 235, at 488-89 (overviewing European law on this
issue and observing that Germany (prior to 2008), Spain, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic prohibit all transfers in future media and that France permits it only when
the contractual language is express, specific, and provides for author royalties).
241. See Boosey, 145 F.3d at 487 ("Because licensors are often authors-whose creativity
the copyright laws intend to nurture-and are often impecunious . . . there is sometimes a
tendency in copyright scholarship and adjudication to seek solutions that favor licensors over
licensees.").
242. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (quoting Jondora Music Publ'g Co. v. Melody Recordings,
Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1975)).
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not now 'reap the entire windfall' associated with the new medium."243
In Europe, as well, notions of fairness and the bargaining weakness of
authors motivate author-protective new media rules.2 4 4 Limits on new
media transfers thus serve as another example of how US copyright
law seeks to protect authors from unknowing transfers of rights.
In summary, copyright law limits alienability in a number of
ways. For reasons analogous to the termination right, these rules can
be understood as a variety of author-protective paternalism. These
provisions are justified by distributive goals and the weak bargaining
position of authors, either because of structural factors or because of
authors' shortsightedness, poverty, or romantic nature. If motivated
by a romantic conception of the author, they raise the question of
whether such an author is actually responsive to copyright's extrinsic
incentive to create. If motivated instead by authors' lack of market
power, they may be less paternalistic in motivation but remain
paternalistic in operation. These provisions limit the contractual
freedom of authors for their own supposed best interest-limitations
that at least some authors do not want. For example, in return for
other compensation, some authors may wish to transfer rights in new
media or forfeit termination rights by designating a commissioned
work as made for hire. Either way, these provisions are in tension
with the economically rational actor presumed by the incentive model.
C. The Elimination of Formalities
For most of its history (1790 to 1976), American copyright law
required particular procedures-collectively called "formalities"-to
assert and maintain a copyright.245 First, in order to claim copyright
at all, the author was required to register the work with the federal
government and send a copy of the work to the Register of
Copyright.246 Second, upon publication, the author was required to
place appropriate notice of copyright on the work, such as the familiar
243. Id. (quoting Comments, Past Copyright Licenses and the New Video Software
Medium, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1160, 1184 (1982)).
244. See Darling, supra note 235, at 497 ("[A]ccording to lawmakers in countries that
prohibit the grant of new use rights, the main goal is to allocate to authors the financial returns
of their artistic works . . . . [S]ome fear that creators might transfer their rights to new uses to
publishers because creators face a variety of bargaining disadvantages .... .").
245. See generally Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 314 n.11 (2012) ("From the first
Copyright Act until late in the 20th century, Congress conditioned copyright protection on
compliance with certain statutory formalities. The most notable required an author to register
her work, renew that registration, and affix to published copies notice of copyrighted status.");
Sprigman, supra note 67, at 490-94 (reviewing history of formalities).
246. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 1, 10, 12, 53-55, 35 Stat.
1075, 1075-76, 1078, 1085-86.
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C symbol.24 7  Third, at the end of a relatively brief initial term
(fourteen or twenty-eight years), the author had to renew the
copyright if she wished to claim an additional term.2 4 8 The result of
noncompliance with these formalities was often harsh: the author
would effectively lose the copyright, either because the right would fail
to arise, the copyright would became unenforceable, or the work would
fall into the public domain.2 49
From an international law perspective, these formalities were
an anomalous feature of American law.2 5 0 Beginning in the 1976 Act
and culminating in the 1989 Berne Convention Implementation Act
(the BCIA), Congress eliminated mandatory copyright formalities to
conform to international standards.251  Renewal was eliminated
entirely in favor of a unitary copyright term with a termination
right.252 Although current law provides some incentives to encourage
registration, deposit, and notice, failure to comply no longer causes a
loss of copyright protection.253 The practical impact was to eliminate
the "filtering" function that mandatory formalities had previously
served.254 From the perspective of the incentive model, formalities
make a good deal of sense because they ensure that copyright is given
only to those authors for whom copyright mattered, as evinced by the
affirmative steps that the authors took to claim copyright.255 If the
author did not bother to assert a copyright, it seems likely that
copyright was not the impetus for the work's creation (or, at least, that
the work was of minimal commercial value). The data on registration
and renewals show that, in practice, the majority of published authors
did not bother to register their works, and few registered works were
renewed.256
247. Id. §§ 9-11.
248. Id. §§ 23-24; see also supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text (discussing
copyright renewal).
249. Sprigman, supra note 67, at 493.
250. NIMMER & NIMER, supra note 234, § 7.01[A] ("For decades, the outstanding feature
distinguishing United States copyright law from that of the rest of the world has been its
emphasis on formalities.").
251. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853; see also Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, §§ 101-102, 106 Stat.
264, 264-66.
252. See supra notes 179-188 (explaining termination of transfers right).
253. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(1), 401(d), 402(d), 407(a), 408(a) (2012); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S.
302, 307 (2012) ("Congress no longer requires [formalities] as prerequisites to copyright
protection. . . .").
254. Sprigman, supra note 67, at 502-03 (explaining this function).
255. See id. at 514 ("In sum, this initial filter separating commercially valuable works
from commercially valueless works helped focus the pre-1976 copyright regime in a way that
maximized the incentive value of copyright while reducing the social costs.").
256. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
2017] 457
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
The elimination of formalities was driven by several different
justifications. Congress's primary purpose in the BCIA was a
practical one: it wanted to comply with the main international
intellectual property treaty to ensure reciprocal protection of US
copyrights abroad and thus gain considerable economic and trade
benefits.257 It is thus more relevant to know what motivated the
creation of the Berne Convention's Article 5(2), the international anti-
formality provision.258  Some claim that formalities are simply
inconsistent with the "natural rights" conception of copyright
predominant in continental Europe.259 Others argue that the Berne
approach was principally motivated by administrative difficulties for
authors who had to comply with multiple cumbersome formalities in
different nations in order to reach an international market.260 Finally,
there was concern that formalities had become a "trap for the
unwary," resulting in unfair forfeitures of copyright when a careless
author failed to comply or made a mistake in attempted compliance.261
Especially on this final rationale, the elimination of the
formalities can be understood as a paternalistic aspect of copyright.
Although they are technical, the former provisions requiring notice
and registration were neither very expensive nor difficult to comply
with. Yet, historically, the majority of authors chose not to comply.
The reasons for noncompliance were no doubt varied: some were
unaware of the obligation, some did not think their work valuable
enough, some neglected it, some "lost track," and some simply did not
257. See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 171-72 (1989) (emphasizing the economic benefits of
international conformity and reciprocal treatment for American intellectual property).
258. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 9,
1886, 12 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=283698
[https://perma.ccIHDQ7-BEYF] (most recently amended Sept. 28, 1979).
259. See Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The Future of United States Copyright
Formalities: Why We Should Prioritize Recordation, and How to Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1459, 1470-71 (2013) ("Many Berne signatories took a droit d'auteur approach .... Under such a
"natural" or "human rights" regime, requiring compliance with a set of state-prescribed
formalities as a precondition to the exercise of rights is difficult to justify."); supra notes 78-84
(overviewing natural rights theories of copyright).
260. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, A Realist Approach to Copyright Law's Formalities, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1511, 1518-19 (2013) (rejecting the moral rights account and noting that
"authors and publishers faced overly cumbersome copyright formalities, operating in an
increasingly international market"); accord Sprigman, supra note 67, at 539-44.
261. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 314 n.11 (2012) ("[American copyright] formalities
drew criticism as a trap for the unwary."); accord Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with
Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 342-
43 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 143 (1976) ("One of the strongest arguments for revision of
the present statute has been the need to avoid the arbitrary and unjust forfeitures now resulting
from unintentional or relatively unimportant omissions or errors in the copyright notice.").
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wish to claim copyright.262 The elimination of formalities protects
authors from the consequence of their own noncompliance, whether
willful or merely careless. It thus prevents unwanted forfeitures at
the significant social cost of awarding copyright by default to all
authors-regardless of whether they need it as an incentive, and
whether they want it or not.
The elimination of formalities is also in stark tension with the
incentive model, regardless of which concern motivated Berne Article
5(2). If copyright was the primary motivation for an author's creation,
as the incentive model supposes, such an author would likely take the
time to comply with registration and notice requirements. The fact
that, historically, many authors did not suggests that copyright was
not a primary factor motivating their creativity. It follows that our
current no-formality system is awarding copyrights by default to many
authors who did not need the copyright incentive to create.
D. Tensions with the Incentive Model
Copyright's paternalistic provisions create problems for the
incentive model. In the United States, the importance of incentives
for authors dominates the copyright discourse, both for those in favor
of more limited copyright and those who defend copyright's
expansion.263 Taken at face value, the incentive model assumes that
authors respond rationally to economic incentives, an assumption that
is at odds with copyright's paternalistic provisions.
The tension arises from two different understandings of author
rationality in copyright. On the one hand, the basic premise of
copyright relies upon the notion that authors respond to incentives as
calculating economic actors. On the other hand, many of the actual
provisions in copyright law are motivated by paternalism and suppose
a shortsighted or unsophisticated author who is unable to effectively
look out for his own economic interests and is in need of protection
from the law. These two conflicting conceptions of the author
complicate copyright's incentive story. If authors will make bad deals
because they discount future revenue, was that future revenue really
262. See Ginsburg, supra note 261, at 342 ("[N]ot all those who fail to [comply] do so
because they do not care about their works. Some lose track; some are ignorant of the obligation,
particularly if they reside in foreign countries which do not impose formalities; some may find
the fees prohibitive.").
263. Compare, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1603-25 (using incentive theory to urge
limitation on copyright infringement to foreseeable uses), with Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
206 (2003) (upholding twenty-year copyright term extension because it may "provide greater
incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in the United
States").
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their primary motivation? If authors will neglect to comply with
copyright formalities, was copyright the reason for their artistic
creation? Because this tension speaks to the internal logic of
copyright, it exists regardless of one's view of the empirical critiques of
the incentive model.
In short, copyright does not fully believe its own creation story.
This realization is important, both in itself and as a rhetorical
counterweight to the incentive model. The incentives-for-authors
story has been profoundly successful in securing expansions of
copyright from Congress including repeated term increases,264
inclusion of new subject matter,265 and even the removal of works from
the public domain.266 Many scholars have noted the rhetorical power
of the incentive model and its tendency to operate as a one-way
ratchet supporting continual, repeated expansions of copyright.267
Copyright's paternalistic provisions undermine the persuasiveness-
and thus the power-of the incentive story.
Of course, it must be noted that this tension between the
incentive model and copyright's paternalistic provisions is capable,
conceptually, of multiple resolutions. For example, one could rely
upon differences in timing to reconcile the incentive model and
copyright paternalism. Perhaps the author behaves like a rational
economic actor when he decides whether or not to engage in artistic
creation, but then later acts more impulsively when negotiating a
copyright assignment. While this resolution is logically possible, it is
not particularly persuasive. A contract negotiation occurs in an
economic context that specifically calls for weighing of costs and
benefits.268 Artistic creation, by contrast, is typically motivated by a
complex mix of intrinsic motivations as well as economic ones.2 69 If
anything, we should expect authors to accord more closely with the
rational actor model at the time of assignment versus the time of
264. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194-96 (reviewing history of copyright term extensions).
265. See, e.g., Act of October 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (creating limited
copyright in sound recordings).
266. See Golan, 565 U.S. at 327-30 (upholding "restoration" of copyright for certain
foreign works that were previously in the public domain in the United States).
267. See, e.g., Ku et al., supra note 61, at 1681-84 (describing the "rhetorical force"
behind the incentive model and how it has been exploited to expand copyright); Jessica Litman,
War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344 (2002) ("Recently, copyright legislation has
seemed to be a one-way ratchet, increasing the subject matter, scope, and duration of copyright
with every amendment."); Sterk, supra note 37, at 1197 (explaining how the rhetoric of providing
incentives to deserving authors has fueled a continual expansion of copyright, despite the gap
between the rhetoric and reality).
268. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 97, at 52-58 (reviewing effects of priming on
encouraging or discouraging analytical decision making).
269. See supra Section I.B (reviewing evidence of intrinsic motivation).
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creation-precisely the opposite of what existing copyright law
supposes.
It is also possible to deny the tension by interpreting
copyright's paternalistic provisions as motivated by differences in
market power that are purely structural and economic in nature. On
this view, the author acts rationally in both creation and assignment;
it is merely that publishers have a dominant bargaining position due
to overwhelming market power. Provisions like termination rights
and alienability limits may be paternalistic in operation, but not in
motivation. This argument suggests that the author is perfectly
rational at all times, but is economically helpless when negotiating
with intermediaries.
This account reduces the tension somewhat, but it raises a few
critical questions. If copyright's paternalistic interventions are solely
about market power, why do they function to undermine the
bargaining position of most authors? A purely rational actor, even if
economically weak, would not want these interventions; they only
serve to reduce his bargaining power by limiting what he can sell.
2 70
Rational authors would prefer to at least have the option of
transferring termination rights or designating a work as made for hire
in exchange for a better deal.27 1 Moreover, if equalizing bargaining
power was truly the aim, it would be more straightforward for the law
to intervene in the actual negotiation, as opposed to merely providing
some easily satisfied formal requirements and a distant termination
right.272 Finally, the empirical basis for this view has weakened in the
digital age. Even if the market power of publishers and record
companies was once fearsome, it has lately been undermined by
alternative means of dissemination in the digital era.
2 7 3
In sum, it is difficult to reconcile the vision of the author
supposed by copyright's paternalistic provisions and that supposed by
copyright's dominant incentive model. The next Part explores the
potential policy consequences of this important tension within
copyright law.
270. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
271. See Darling, supra note 196, at 190-91.
272. Cf. Rub, supra note 190, at 86 ("Even if the concern of unequal sophistication and
experience level [of authors] requires legal intervention, solutions should focus on the time of
negotiation.").
273. See generally, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (reviewing
how the Internet has allowed "consumers themselves [to] build and fund the distribution
channels for digital content").
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V. PATERNALISTIC COPYRIGHT
This Part will consider what copyright law would look like
using the vision of the author supposed by copyright's paternalistic
provisions. If authors are subject to behavioral effects, copyright's
existing paternalistic provisions are an inadequate solution. Like
many soft paternalistic interventions, they tend to fail for the same
reasons that motivated their creation: because they primarily function
only to shift contractual default rules, they are easily circumvented.
Even worse, they have unfortunate side effects, leading to troubling
distributional consequences and significant social costs. Our current
hybrid system thus risks incurring the costs of a paternalistic regime
without actually ensuring that authors see a piece of the profits from
their creations.
If the goal is truly to protect authors, we would need stronger
medicine than the provisions of current law. BLE scholarship has
revealed that hard paternalism and direct mandates are sometimes
necessary to effectively remedy behavioral failures.274 Building on this
insight, a truly paternalistic copyright law would replace termination
rights with more meaningful protections for authors against one-sided
contracts. For example, the law might make copyright transfers
voidable at the election of the author if their terms are unreasonably
onerous or one-sided, or might guarantee authors a minimum
compensation or royalty.
On the incentives side, evidence of intrinsic motivation should
lead to a reevaluation of the incentive model. If many authors do not
need or respond to economic incentives in their decision to create, our
current means of encouraging creativity seem ill-designed, and we
should consider means that are more closely tailored to actual human
behavior. In an ideal world, for example, the law would vary the scope
and strength of legal protection based on the significance of the
copyright incentive.275 As the intrinsic motivation literature reveals,
economic incentives matter more to some authors than to others-and
more in some contexts than in others. Reinstating formalities offers
one way to ensure that copyright only goes to those who were truly
motivated by its extrinsic incentive.276 Finally, relying on an indirect
274. See supra notes 121-137 and accompanying text.
275. Ct, e.g., Loren, supra note 73, at 3 (arguing that copyright "should take creator and
distributor motivation into account in determining how robust the copyright protection afforded
should be"). See generally Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 849 (2006) (arguing that one-size-fits-all
intellectual property rights create costs and analyzing means to tailor copyrights and patents).
276. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 148, at 287-91; WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO Fix COPYRIGHT
203-09 (2012); Sprigman, supra note 67, at 545-68 (urging re-introduction of copyright
462 [Vol. XIX:3:415
COPYRIGHT PATERNALISM
system of uncertain economic incentives may not be the most effective
way to encourage creation. We might consider directly funding some
artistic creation in exchange for limitations or waivers of copyright.
2 7 7
Although this creates obvious costs, it is a certain and present-time
incentive to which humans are more likely to respond.
These ideas are intended as exploration of where the rationales
of copyright paternalism lead, not as a firm normative endorsement of
particular policies. There are, of course, many potential ways to
reconcile the conflict between the incentive model and copyright's
paternalistic provisions, depending on one's prior normative
presumptions. Some scholars base copyright on deontological values
and have no use for the incentive model to begin with.
2 78 Some may
see no particular unfairness when authors sell away their rights for a
small payment and their works later become tremendously
valuable.279 Some may find the costs of paternalistic interventions too
great for their potential benefits.280 Nonetheless, analyzing the logic
of copyright paternalism offers insights into the effectiveness of both
copyright's existing paternalistic provisions and its incentive structure
more generally.
A. Existing Paternalistic Provisions Are Ineffective
Copyright's current paternalistic provisions are an ineffective
solution to the behavioral failures that they purport to remedy. These
aspects of copyright are mainly formal requirements or changes to
contractual defaults. In most cases, they simply mean that an author
will assign away her rights by a different form (a written agreement)
or in a different way (a copyright transfer, as opposed to a "work made
for hire" designation)-not that she will get a better deal. With the
formalities). For a skeptical take on these proposals, see Brad A. Greenberg, More than Just a
Formality: Instant Authorship and Copyright's Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 1028, 1028 (2012) (arguing that reintroduction of formalities suffers from problems of scale
in the digital age due to the frequency of authorship).
277. Cf. Ku et al., supra note 61, at 1719-23 (suggesting increased direct funding of arts
as a more effective means than copyright for encouraging creativity).
278. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (creators of Superman sold away rights for $130); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124
(1976) (stating that the goal of termination as "safeguarding authors against unremunerative
transfers").
280. In particular, a direct funding approach suffers from the serious drawback that
government, not the market, has power to select which projects to subsidize, and that costs of
creation are borne directly by taxpayers (as opposed to indirectly by consumers of art). See
generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92
TEX. L. REV. 303, 304 (2013) (providing an analytical framework for assessing costs and benefits
of incentivizing creation via intellectual property rights, prizes, and subsidies).
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exception of termination rights, copyright's paternalistic provisions do
not actually prohibit anything, and none of them directly address
underlying bargaining imbalances or behavioral effects. As a result,
these soft paternalistic provisions tend to fail in achieving their stated
goals: changing the supposedly poor decisions of authors or achieving
a fairer distribution of the returns from artistic work.
The limitations on copyright alienability offer a prime example.
Writing requirements such as section 204(a) merely dictate the form of
a copyright transfer.281 If authors are systematically disadvantaged in
bargaining and subject to behavioral shortsightedness, this provision
offers only illusory protection. Such authors will simply sign away
their copyright for a relatively small sum as opposed to orally
assigning it for that same small sum.
The restrictions on transfers of rights in new media similarly
lack real bite. Even in relatively author-friendly jurisdictions like the
Ninth Circuit, rights in new media can be transferred, so long as there
is a clear statement to that effect.282 Unlike comparable European
rules, no American jurisdiction categorically prohibits assigning away
rights in media that do not yet exist.283 The American requirements
may shift the contractual default slightly in favor of the author, but in
the end they only dictate the form of the transfer. If authors are
chronically weak bargainers, and intermediaries are sophisticated
repeat players, the same transfers will recur, albeit with slightly
stronger contractual language. The situation is, of course, even worse
in jurisdictions, like the Second Circuit, that do not even require a
clear statement.284
Termination rights, formally the strongest and most prominent
paternalistic provision, do not fare much better. Termination rights
are meaningless to the vast majority of authors because of the simple
fact that few works are still commercially valuable thirty-five years
after their creation.285 Termination thus benefits only a tiny minority
of authors or, commonly, their heirs.286 Worse, termination operates
to reduce the bargaining power of most authors. Traditional economic
281. See supra notes 209-218 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 235-239 and accompanying text.
283. See Darling, supra note 235, at 488-89.
284. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ'rs v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 487 (2d Cir.
1998).
285. See Darling, supra note 196; William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright
System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 922 (1997) (calling the termination
right "virtually meaningless").
286. See, e.g., Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 195-96 (2d Cir. 2008)
(heirs of John Steinbeck seeking termination); see also Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger,




analysis predicts that the authors will get a slightly worse deal from
intermediaries as a result of termination rights because authors have
fewer rights to sell.2 87  Authors simply cannot commit to an
assignment of copyright for longer than thirty-five years, even if they
wish to do so in exchange for other consideration. To be effective for
the typical author, termination rights would need to operate on a
much shorter time scale. However, it is probably wiser to alleviate the
perceived unfairness of one-sided transfers through simpler
mechanisms than the cumbersome termination process.
288
Finally, the "work made for hire" restrictions offer weak
protection, at best, for freelance authors. These limitations are
important because they prohibit works being treated as "made for
hire" by default except in one situation: when authors are truly
employees of the hiring party.289 However, the restrictions do nothing
to prevent the transfer of copyrights in commissioned works from
freelance authors to the hiring party. Even for those types of works
that cannot, as a matter of law, be designated as "made for hire,"
authors remain free to assign away all their rights via contract.
290 If
freelance authors lack the bargaining power to reject contractual
designations of their work as made for hire (the stated premise of the
regulation),29 1 then they likely also lack bargaining power to resist
assignments of their copyrights. The work made for hire restrictions
thus operate mainly to preserve termination rights, which are not
valuable to most creators.
Like much soft paternalism, copyright's existing paternalistic
provisions tend to fail for the very reasons that motivated their
creation. Moreover, these provisions are not only ineffective; they also
have several unfortunate side effects. First, termination rights have
troubling distributional consequences. Termination only benefits a
small subset of commercially successful authors whose work is still
valuable thirty-five years later. Its benefits flow to (the heirs of) those
authors who need it least, at a time-decades after creation-when
they are likely to need it least.
2 92 Moreover, these windfalls for a
287. See Darling, supra note 196, at 165-66.
288. See infra notes 305-309 and accompanying text (suggesting minimum royalties or
rules against enforcement of onerous, one-sided contracts).
289. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2012); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
740-41 (1989).
290. See § 101(1); Reid, 490 U.S. at 740-41.
291. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
292. For example, many successful popular music artists-e.g., Bruce Springsteen, Bob
Dylan, Tom Petty-have asserted termination rights in their recordings from the late 1970s. See
Rother, supra note 5. While there is nothing inherently wrong with these artists re-negotiating
their contracts to get a bigger share of the return from their works, it is striking that the benefits
of a legal provision with redistributive purposes flow primarily to these well-off artists.
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lucky few come at the expense of the majority of authors whose works
lack lasting commercial viability. Second, requirements on the form of
copyright assignment, such as section 204(a) or the clear statement
rule for new media, will raise transaction costs. These costs might be
worth it if copyright's paternalistic provisions effectively secured
substantial benefits to authors, but they do not.
Furthermore, some of copyright's existing paternalistic
provisions carry significant social costs for these comparatively small
benefits. The elimination of formalities stands out in this dubious
respect. Unlike copyright's other paternalistic interventions, granting
copyright by default does seem to work. Formally, it is simply a
change to a default rule: instead of having to expressly claim a
copyright in your works, the copyright is granted automatically the
instant that a work is written down.2 9 3 There is no simple or low-cost
way to avoid default copyright, however: the law does not provide any
mechanism for an author to dedicate his work to the public domain.294
To be sure, private contractual responses, such as Creative Commons
licenses, can be used by authors to limit the scope of their copyright.295
But there is no true "anti-©" that an author can use to disclaim
copyright, and Creative Commons licenses will not reach most works
because of the stickiness of the default and the immense volume of
copyrighted material.296 Automatic copyright means that every email,
note, list, and scribbling is protected by copyright the moment it is
written down.2 9 7 Granting copyright by default to this huge body of
works and to many creators who did not need it as an incentive
creates significant social costs to the public and future creators.298
B. Hard Paternalism and Tailoring Copyright Incentives
If they truly hope to address the behavioral phenomena
motivating copyright paternalism, lawmakers should embrace hard
293. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
294. Sprigman, supra note 67, at 518 ("[There is no provision in our current
unconditional regime establishing rules for how dedication [to the public domain] may be
accomplished, and it has never been conclusively determined under current law that one may
irreversibly dedicate a work to the public domain.").
295. See generally Adrienne K. Goss, Codifying A Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the
Creative Commons Project, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 977-82 (2007); What We Do, CREATIVE
COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about, [https://perma.cclV54Q-A7KT] (last visited Jan. 24,
2017) (describing purpose and uses of Creative Commons licenses).
296. See supra notes 100, 109 and accompanying text (describing status quo bias and
effect of changes to default rules).
297. See generally LESSIG, supra note 148, at 137-39 (describing expansion in copyright
to "every e-mail, every note to your spouse, every doodle" due to the elimination of formalities).
298. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text (discussing costs of copyright).
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paternalistic tools for author protection. The experience of the BLE
movement reveals that soft paternalistic interventions often fail to
correct, and can even exacerbate, behavioral failures.299 As the last
Section revealed, copyright's current half-hearted paternalism is
ineffective and potentially harmful to its goals. If authors are truly
incapable of protecting their own interests, shifts in contractual
defaults or modest formal requirements will not help them. This
Section offers some suggestions for how copyright might more
effectively achieve the goals of copyright paternalism.
Much of copyright's existing paternalism appears to be
motivated by a conception of authors as lacking bargaining power in
their dealings with intermediaries-whether this is a result of
behavioral failures such as bounded willpower and its attendant
shortsightedness,300 a structural lack of market power,
301 or social
preferences for a more equal allocation of resources.
302 Many people
perceive an unfairness when an author creates a successful artistic
work but gets only a pittance for it.303 If unequal bargaining is the
problem, the use of termination rights, limitations on alienability, and
default copyright do not effectively address it. Some commentators
have proposed to intervene directly at the bargaining stage by
increasing information disclosures, involving agents or counselors, or
requiring cooling-off periods.304 These reforms might improve results
somewhat, but they remain soft BLE tools and are subject to the same
powerful critiques. Instead of trying to nudge authors into better
decisions through more contractual procedures or information
disclosure, it may be more effective simply to mandate the distributive
results sought, such as guaranteeing authors a minimum royalty or
equitable compensation.
This idea is not as radical as it might initially appear. Many
European countries make guarantees to authors along these lines.
German copyright law, for example, contains an inalienable right that
authors receive "equitable remuneration" for their work, and the
author can demand reformation of any agreement that fails to provide
such compensation.30 5 Recent revisions to the copyright laws of the
299. See supra notes 121-137 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 102-103, 156-159 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 197-199, 229 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 105, 111, 160-162 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
304. Rub, supra note 190, at 85-86 (suggesting such reforms).
305. Gesetz tiber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGB1 I at 1273 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im
-internet.deurhg/32.html [https://perma.cc/F3DF-79LT]. See generally Karsten M. Gutsche,
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Netherlands, intended to conform to continental European standards,
provide similar author-protective guarantees.306 Fair compensation is
mandated, contractual terms that are unreasonably onerous are
voidable at the election of the author, and an author can seek
additional compensation if the original contractual compensation is
"seriously disproportionate" to the profit made from exploiting the
work.307  These requirements accomplish the goals underlying
American termination rights and limitations on copyright alienability
but do so in a more direct way that embraces a hard paternalistic
approach.
In theory, we could accomplish similar ends by modifying
termination rights to operate on a much shorter time scale or
premising them upon some showing of actual contractual inequity or
bargaining failure. Termination rights are a relatively costly way to
accomplish these ends, however, and not only because they are
administratively cumbersome.308  Termination also creates
inefficiencies in the exploitation of the work over time. For example, a
publisher expecting that termination may soon occur, say, because the
end of the maximum initial assignment period is near, will tend to
under-invest in the exploitation of the work, since he will not see all
the future profits from it.309 All other things being equal, the direct
European approach seems a sounder course.
Of course, although European-style contractual mandates
would effectively advance the stated goals of copyright paternalism,
they have their own significant costs. The obvious concern is that they
would cause intermediaries to exploit fewer works, or even drive them
from the market, if they cannot effectively use all of the profits from
successful "hit" works to subsidize commercial failures.310 These costs
can be reduced by carefully limiting the scope of when compensation is
"inequitable" or "seriously disproportionate," but it must be recognized
that this is a serious concern. On the other hand, the sky has not
fallen in Europe.
Equitable Remuneration for Authors in Germany-How the German Copyright Act Secures Their
Rewards, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 257 (2003).
306. See generally Thomas Dysart, Author-Protective Rules and Alternative Licences: A
Review of the Dutch Copyright Contract Act, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
307. Gesetz Uiber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGB1 I at 1273 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/urhg/ 32.html [https://perma.cc/F3DF-79LT]; Dysart, supra note 306, at 3-4.
308. See Grimmelmann, supra note 189 (noting the "immense administrative cost" of
termination rights).
309. See Darling, supra note 196, at 168-75 (analyzing how termination can distort
publisher investment incentives).




Compulsory licenses provide another policy lever that could be
used to mandate adequate compensation for artists. Compulsory
licenses replace the property rule of copyright with something closer to
a liability rule.311 Instead of requiring permission from the copyright
holder to use the work, the public is free to make particular uses so
long as they pay the copyright holder a fee specified by law. The
classic example is the so-called "cover license" for musical works.
3 12
An artist who wants to record a different version of a previously
published musical work does not need to get permission from the
original author; instead, she simply has to pay the copyright holder a
set statutory fee.3 1 3 If structured to guarantee this reward to the
author-as opposed to the copyright owner-then compulsory licenses
could be another potential way to construct author-protective rules.
Compulsory licenses have the benefit of lowering transaction costs,
because prior permission need not be sought and negotiated. This
comes at the expense, however, of reduced incentives for creation and
dissemination, inflexibility, and the dangers of government-set
prices.314
As to creation incentives, the policy implications of copyright
paternalism are somewhat more complicated. At the least, however,
evidence of intrinsic motivation and other behavioral effects should
cause some rethinking of copyright's incentive structure. We should
consider tailoring incentives for creation to more closely accord with
what is known about human behavior. In particular, we should
explore ways to ensure that copyright only goes to those actually
motivated by its extrinsic incentive to create. Granting copyright by
default to intrinsically motivated authors creates large social costs
without any obvious benefit.315 Reinstating some formalities, a reform
advocated by many scholars, is one way to tailor copyright
incentives.316 However, recognition of the potential behavioral failures
in authors' awareness of copyright requirements may cause us to
temper this reform somewhat. Because some people may be motivated
311. See generally Robert P. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972);
Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302-17 (1996).
312. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2)-(3)(A) (2012); Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around
Liability Rules, 100 CAL. L. REV. 463, 478-79 (2012). See generally Howard B. Abrams,
Copyright's First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215 (2010)
(reviewing history of cover license for musical works).
313. 17 U.S.C § 115(c).
314. See generally Merges, supra note 311 (criticizing compulsory licenses for their
inflexibility and for their susceptibility to political lobbying).
315. See supra Section IIB; supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 276 (citing proposals to reinstate copyright formalities).
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by copyright but misinformed about its requirements, the law should
accommodate them with grace periods for claiming copyright and a
liberal interpretation of the required formalities. Regardless of the
details, the key is eliminating the default rule of automatic copyright.
Along similar lines, we might tailor the scope and strength of
copyright protection based on the significance of the copyright
incentive.317  Academics, blog writers, and Wikipedia editors are
motivated by quite a different mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives
than motion picture studios or book publishers. It is difficult to justify
granting an essentially one-size-fits-all copyright to all of these
different types of creation. We should consider limiting the term and
scope of copyright protection based on the kind of work at issue.
Copyright's existing paternalism accommodates this tailoring concern
in a limited way, in that works made for hire are not subject to
termination.3 18  If lawmakers adopt European-style author
protections, those protections could be similarly limited to cases where
authors are most likely to make behavioral mistakes. For example,
the law might exclude works made for hire or works created by
corporate entities from any equitable remuneration requirement.
Finally, in terms of timing, salience, and certainty, the current
incentive structure seems ill-designed. Copyright does not guarantee
authors any economic reward. Instead, it offers an uncertain
possibility of a future reward in an indirect way. These features
create behavioral effects that can undermine the effectiveness of the
copyright incentive, and evidence of intrinsic motivation shows that
many people do in fact discount it. If we are unsatisfied with the
current level of creation, the use of direct, certain, and present-time
incentives is more likely to have an impact on imperfectly rational
actors. For example, increasing subsidies or direct funding for artistic
creation in exchange for waivers of copyright could be employed. Of
course, this costs taxpayer money and raises obvious problems of
government influence over the arts. However, if we are serious about
incentivizing creation, directly supporting authors gives them more
opportunities to engage in their craft. Whatever its flaws, this system
is more likely to be effective as an incentive than increasing copyright
duration or scope of protection.
Indeed, it is equally important to consider the policy levers that
a paternalistic copyright regime would seek to avoid. Accepting that
humans are imperfectly rational actors strongly counsels against
reforms that rely on increasing marginal incentives for creation.
There would seem to be little incentive value in, for example,
317. See supra note 275 (citing proposals to tailor copyright).
318. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c).
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increasing the length of the copyright term by an additional twenty
years or expanding the scope of copyright to all derivative works.
3 1 9
Such incentives-premised reforms seem at best useless and very likely
counterproductive, given the real costs of copyright.320 Of course, such
reforms have been precisely the approach of copyright lawmaking
from the 1976 Copyright Act until the present. Given that a full-scale
revision of American copyright law may be in the making, we should
not repeat our mistakes on this front.321
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright law ought to be consistent with its own rationales
and in its conception of the author. By incorporating aspects of both
an incentive-based and paternalistic regime, we risk getting the costs,
but not the benefits, of both systems. The public and future creators
bear the costs of expansive copyrights granted by default. These costs
are justified by a vision of author protectionism that eschews
copyright forfeitures if an author fails to comply with formalities.
However, copyright fails to follow through on this logic to obtain the
purported benefit of its paternalistic provisions-actually securing fair
compensation to authors. Copyright's current half-hearted
paternalism is ineffective at securing its distributive and author-
protective goals. If we are serious about these aims, mandatory
protections for authors are more likely to achieve them.
319. See id. § 106(2) (granting authors the exclusive right "to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work"); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No.
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending copyright duration an additional twenty years).
320. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
321. See Pallante, supra note 20 and accompanying text. Of course, the desire to conform
to international standards may complicate the practical viability of some proposals, such as
decreased term length.
4712017]

